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Economic theory teaches that if all of the operational conditions of the
perfectly competitive model hold, then certain efficiencies may be
achieved to the favor of a wealth-seeking society, ceteris paribus (assum-
ing all other things remain equal and/or the absence of all other
disturbing influences). This Article observes the asymmetrical enforcement
of relevant governing laws, regulations and rules eliminates any possib-
ility that all other influences with respect to the performance values of the
perfectly competitive model have been neutralized. Under such regulatory
enforcement conditions, there can be no wealth-creation expectations.
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"If old truths are to retain their hold on men's minds, they must be restated in the
language and concepts of successive generations. "'
Friedrich A. Hayek, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, 1960.
"There are no fully appropriate analogies to this task of the political economist, but the
role of medical diagnostician perhaps comes closest. The patient is observed to be ill; a
remedy is prescribed. ,,2
James M. Buchanan, THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITIONAL LIBERTY, 1964.
"I believe we need government to enforce the rules of the game."3
Milton Friedman, PLAYBOY, 1973.
INTRODUCTION
We have long been instructed that the congressional passage of a bill,
ultimately approved by the President (as evidenced by his or her signature
thereto), establishes "'the policy of the United States' to the exclusion of
any different executive or administra[tive] policy .... " 4 Such policy has
"binding force and effect on every officer of the Government, no matter
what their private judgments of that policy," 5 and most importantly, at
least from the perspective of this Article, "[n]o executive statement
denying [the] efficacy [of such] legislation could have either validity or
effect., 6 We are constitutionally charged that such a bill, made under the
authority of the United States Constitution, "shall be the supreme Law of
the Land,' 7 and the President "shall take Care that ... [it] be faithfully
executed.",8 The United States Supreme Court has reinforced this charge
1. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 1 (Neil H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds.,
Legal Classics Library 1999) (1960).
2. James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political
Economy, 2 J.L. ECON. 124 (1959), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M.
BUCHANAN: THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 191, 196 (1999)
[hereinafter THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN]. See generally James M.
Buchanan, What Should Economists Do?, 30 S. ECON. J. 213 (1964), reprinted in 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, supra, at 28-42 [hereinafter Buchanan,
What Should Economists Do?].
3. Playboy Interview: Milton Friedman, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1973 [hereinafter Milton
Interview], available at http://www.playboy.conarticles/milton-friedman-interview/.
4. DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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by interpreting the Take Care Clause 9 as imposing upon the President the
duty to enforce the law.10 This executive responsibility of ensuring the
enforcement of constitutionally promulgated laws is not exclusive to our
federal constitutional regime." All (or nearly all) state constitutional
9. Id.
10. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1838); id. at 613 ('To contend
that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a
power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely
inadmissible."); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587
(1952) ("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution
limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal
about who shall make laws which the President is to execute."); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 187 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ('The general duty to enforce all
laws cannot justify infraction of some of them."); CHRISTOPER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL
DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PEROGATIVE 16 (1998)
("The duty to execute the laws 'faithfully' means that American presidents may not-
whether by revocation, suspension, dispensation, inaction, or otherwise-refuse to honor
and enforce statutes.
11. All but one of the fifty states mandate the "faithful execution" of their respective
laws, and the one exception nonetheless imposes upon its chief executive the respon-
sibility of enforcing its lawfully promulgated laws. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 120 ("The
governor shall take care that all the laws be faithfully executed."); ALASKA CONST. art.
III, § 16 ("The governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws.");
ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 4 ("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."); ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 7 ("[The governor] shall see that the laws are
faithfully executed."); CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1 ("The Governor shall see that the law is
faithfully executed."); COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("[The governor] shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."); CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 12 ("[The governor] shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."); DEL. CONST. art. III, § 17 ("[The governor]
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a) ("[The
governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ); GA. CONST. art. V, §
2, 2 ("The Governor shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed .... "); HAW.
CONST. art. V, § 5 ('The governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the
laws."); IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 5 ("[The governor] shall see that the laws are faithfully
executed."); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8 ("[The governor] shall be responsible for the faithful
execution of the laws."); IND. CONST. art. V, § 16 ('The Governor shall take care that the
laws are faithfully executed."); IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 9 ("[The governor] shall take care
that the laws are faithfully executed."); KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("[The governor] shall be
responsible for the enforcement of the laws of this state."); KY. CONST. § 81 ("[The
governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); LA. CONST. art. IV, §
5(A) ("[The governor] shall faithfully support the constitution and laws of the state and of
the United States and shall see that the laws are faithfully executed."); ME. CONST. art. V,
§ 12 ("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); MD. CONST.
art. II, § 9 ("[The governor] shall take care that the Laws are faithfully executed.");
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regimes similarly charge their executives with the same responsibility.'
2
Yet, state and federal chief executives and their administrative agents
consistently maintain that they possess the authority to decline to execute
laws--even those approved by the stroke of their own pens-if they
nonetheless view the law to be unconstitutional
13 or even unfair. 14
MASS. CONST. pmbl. ("It is the duty of the people, therefore, in framing a constitution of
government, to provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an impartial
interpretation, and a faithful execution of them; that every man may, at all times, find his
security in them."); MICH. CONST. art. V, § 8 ("The governor shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed."); MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4 ("[The governor] shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed .... "); MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 123 ("The governor shall see
that the laws are faithfully executed."); Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ('The governor shall take
care that the laws are distributed and faithfully executed .... "); MONT. CONST. art. VI, §
4(1) ("[The governor] shall see that the laws are faithfully executed."); NEB. CONST. art.
IV, § 6 ("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed .... "); NEV.
CONST. art. V, § 7 ("[The governor] shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.");
N.H. CONST. art. 41 ('The governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the
laws."); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, 1 11 (The "[p]owers and duties of [the] Governor
[include] execution of the laws."); N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4 ("[The governor] shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("[The governor]
shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed."); N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(4) ('The
Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 7
("The governor shall have the responsibility to see that the state's ... laws are faithfully
executed."); OHIO CONST. art III, § 6 ("[The governor] shall see that the laws are
faithfully executed."); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 8 ("The Governor shall cause the laws of
the State to be faithfully executed .... "); OR. CONST. art. V, § 10 ("[The governor] shall
take care that the Laws be faithfully executed."); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("[The governor]
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ('The
governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 15
("The Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); S.D. CONST. art.
IV, § 3 ("The Governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the law.");
TENN. CONST. art. III, § 10 ("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."); TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 10 ("[The governor] shall cause the laws to be
faithfully executed .... "); UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 5 ("[The governor] shall see that the
laws are faithfully executed."); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 20 ('The Governor is also to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."); VA. CONST. art. V, § 73 ("The Governor shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("The
governor ... shall see that the laws are faithfully executed."); W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 5
("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); WIS. CONST. art.
V, § IV ("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."); WYo.
CONST. art. IV, § IV ("[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.").
12. See supra note 11.
13. T. J. HALSTEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS: CONSTIrUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 13 (2007); see also
Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993),
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While an executive's refusal to enforce a congressionally enacted
law-ironically approved by the executive at the time of enactment-
implicates separation of powers issues, 15 such issues are not the province
of this Article's analysis. Rather this Article specifically addresses the
efficiency implications relevant to the creation of societal wealth resulting
from an executive's suspension of, dispensation of, or otherwise refusal to
execute a constitutionally promulgated regulation or law. This Article
proffers the hypothesis that the refusal of an executive, either state or
federal, to enforce an otherwise lawfully promulgated regulation or law
results in economic inefficiencies and waste-the antithesis of the
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm ("[T]he President may declare in a
signing statement that a provision of the bill before him is flatly unconstitutional, and that
he will refuse to enforce it."); Memorandum for The Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel
to the President (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm
("Opinions dating to at least 1860 assert the President's authority to decline to effectuate
enactments that the President views as unconstitutional." (citing Memorial of Captain
Meigs, 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 462, 469-70 (1860))); id. ("Moreover, ... numerous Presidents
have provided advance notice of their intention not to enforce specific statutory
requirements that they have viewed as unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court has
implicitly endorsed this practice." (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13
(1983))).
14. See Press Release, Thomas J. Dart, Cook County Sheriff, Cook County Sheriff
Suspends Foreclosure Evictions (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.cookcountysheriff.org/press
_page/press evictionSuspension_10_08_08.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) [hereinafter
Cook County Sheriff's Press Release]. Cook County Sheriff, Thomas J. Dart, announced
that he would no longer execute eviction notices stating, "We're just not going to evict
innocent tenants. It stops today." Id.
15. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
Executive Power, 23 CONST. CoMMENT. 307, 312 (2006) (arguing that "the institution of
the signing statement does not present a serious threat to either the separation of powers
or the legislative process"); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing
Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of
Power, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987) (arguing that the use of presidential signing
statements violates the doctrine of separation of powers); MAY, supra note 10, at 37
("The grant to the president of a qualified rather than an absolute veto; the assumption
implicit in Article I, section 9 that the suspending power belongs to Congress; the
president's Article II duty to ensure that the laws are 'faithfully executed'; the Founders'
conception of the 'executive power'; the fact that the pardon power granted by Article II
was perceived as being entirely distinct from a power to suspend the laws; the absence of
any pressure to include a ban against the suspending power in the Bill of Rights; and the
failure of even the staunchest Anti-Federalists to object that the president had been
entrusted with a suspending power all point to one verdict: The Constitution does not
give the president a power to suspend the laws, not even when the chief executive may
think that a particular law is unconstitutional." (citation omitted)).
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economic models of perfect competition and entrepreneurship and the
fundamental rules of capitalism.
While there are several examples throughout history of executive
disregard for otherwise constitutionally promulgated laws, 16 one of the
more recent examples (and perhaps most apropos with respect to the
hypothesis and argument proffered herein) involves the Cook County
Sheriff for the State of Illinois when he announced on Wednesday,
October 8, 2008, that he was "suspending all foreclosure evictions,"' 17 in
contravention of his statutory duties.is Cook County Sheriff Thomas J.
Dart explained:
These mortgage companies only see pieces of paper, not people, and
don't care who's in the building .... They simply want their money and
don't care who gets hurt along the way. On top of it all, they want
taxpayers to fund their investigative work for them. We're not going to
do their jobs for them anymore. We're just not going to evict innocent
tenants. It stops today.'
9
Sheriff Dart continued, "The people we're interacting with are, many
times, oblivious to the financial straits their landlords might be in .... They
are innocent victims here and they are the ones all of us must step up and
find some way to protect."
20
This example is most apropos and germane to the premise of this
Article for several reasons. First, the Cook County Sheriff's disregard for
the eviction laws of Illinois was premised exclusively on his subjective
beliefs regarding fairness.2 1 Separation of power issues are not implicated
in this example.22 Although the following analysis provides additional
fodder for the argument that such executive disregard constitutes a type of
"substantive line item veto '23 which should be prohibited (if not for
16. See generally MAY, supra note 10, at 101-18. "Between 1789 and 1981 there
were twelve instances where the president failed to comply with a law whose
constitutionality he had objected to in a signing or post-signing statement." Id. at 101.
17. Cook County Sheriff s Press Release, supra note 14.
18. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-101 et seq. (2008).
19. Cook County Sheriff s Press Release, supra note 14.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. See PHILLiP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE & ABUSE OF
ExEcuTIvE DIRECr ACTION 204 (2002) ("These are cases in which chief executives have
specifically rejected provisions of statutes even as they signed the legislation. These
actions are usually based on broad-based claims to constitutional authority."). See
generally LouiS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE RULE OF LAW
constitutional reasons, then certainly for efficiency reasons), this Article's
efficiency argument might likely be overshadowed, if not lost, by
discussions premised upon doctrines of separation of powers and checks
and balances. Thus, this example allows the analysis to go forward in the
absence of such distracting, doctrinal discussions. Second, the executive
disregard in this example cuts at the very heart of the rule of law and its
ultimate purpose in a large, commercial republic driven by competitive,
capitalistic markets. Eviction laws necessarily reflect a society's
recognition of both contract and property rights. 24 Both rights lie at the
heart of our constitutionally governed and organized federal system of
government, and ultimately drive the efficiencies of free enterprise.
The Cook County Sheriff's disregard for the eviction laws of the State
of Illinois evades the will of the Illinois General Assembly and ultimately
constitutes "a revocation, suspension, dispensation, inaction, or otherwise
[refusal] to honor and enforce" a statute that was enacted with their
consent.25 Although such conduct is antithetical to the Founders' vision of
limiting the abuses of a monarch's prerogative to suspend or dispense with
or refuse to execute a law without the consent of the people,26 it also (and
most importantly from the perspective of this Article) disrupts the rules of
the capitalistic market. When the rules of the game are ignored or not
uniformly and equally applied to all players in the game, even if they are
bad rules, market distorting asymmetries are generated which ultimately
jeopardize, if not eliminate, the wealth-creating efficiencies of the
market.
27
As applied to the situation in Cook County, this affects the residential
rental markets straddling the Cook County boundary line. Landlords in
such markets find themselves competing within two distinct geopolitical
regulatory regimes with different rules. At the whim of the Cook County
Sheriff, Cook County landlords are at a competitive disadvantage as
compared to their competitors located just across the Cook County border.
The asymmetrical advantages and disadvantages created by the Sheriff's
suspension of the law permeate other markets linked to the residential
PRESIDENT 130-37 (5th ed., rev., Univ. Press of Kan. 2007) (1978); MAY, supra note 10.
24. See Andrea B. Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring Good Cause
for Tenant Eviction: Dangerous Portents for the United States?, 38 SETON HALL L. REv.
427,475 (2008).
25. MAY, supra note 10, at 16.
26. Id. at 16-18, 37-38.
27. See generally Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors' Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 806 (2009).
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property market, such as the commercial mortgage, rental furniture, and
appliance service markets, and thereby effectuate further inefficiencies.
This Article generalizes the principle that laws, once constitutionally
promulgated, even if ill-conceived, must be executed in order for
economics' model of perfect competition to thrive; laws must be executed
in order for them to produce wealth-creating efficiencies that ultimately
maximize societal well-being in an environment of scarcity.
This Article proceeds within the context of three overriding themes.
First, "old truths" of both a jurisprudential and economic nature-upon
which our great commercial republic was founded-are reiterated and
restated throughout this Article's remaining presentation. 28 Such old truths
form much of the foundation upon which the following arguments are
grounded. Second, this Article adopts the interdisciplinary methods of
Political Economy and thereby frames its discussion and analysis with
diagnostic and remedial purposes. 29 Finally, this Article acknowledges,
maintains, and illustrates that all games have rules and that the rules must
be enforced in order for the game to reach its logical conclusion.30 The
failure to enforce game rules renders the game unplayable.
31
Part I of this Article begins the interdisciplinary discussion of the
problem from a Political Economy perspective. Part II discusses the law
and economics of free enterprise, formally illustrating the wealth-creating
efficiencies of economics' model of perfect competition. Importantly, Part
II identifies the operational conditions necessary for perfect competition to
thrive, including the existence of well-defined individual rights secured by
the universal and equal application of the rule of law. Part III redirects the
Article's focus on the role of the rule of law in nurturing a free and
enterprising society capable of generating great wealth that may ultimately
transcend to the lowest ranks of society.
Part IV, building on the discussion in Part III regarding the intimate
and reciprocating relationship between liberty and the rule of law, returns
the discussion to economics' model of perfect competition-a formalized
abstraction of the reciprocating relationship between liberty and the law.
Part IV focuses much of its discussion on the normative implications of
perfect competition's condition of ceteris paribus/absentus, concluding
that the failure to uniformly and equally enforce all rules relevant to the
game of perfect competition violates the ceteris paribus/absentus
28. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
244
FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE RULE OF LAW
condition. Such a violation jeopardizes, if not precludes, the efficiency
outcomes predicted and expected from a competitive marketplace.
Part V implements simple game theory constructs for the purpose of
illustrating the strategic behavior of market participants within environ-
ments characterized by varying degrees of executive discretion with
respect to "faithful execution" of the jurisdiction's laws. Part VI concludes
the analysis by demonstrating the asymmetric competitive advantages and
disadvantages that are created within a single market when the rule of law
is ignored, suspended, or otherwise not uniformly enforced by the chief
executive of the jurisdiction in play.
I. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ITS INTERDISCIPLINARY
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
A. A Great Society and the Fallacy of Individual Subjectivism
The pursuit of a great society will fail if its theoretical and governing
orientation is dominated by individual subjectivism. When the common
good is defined by the subjective choices of the ruling few, "the issue of
good and evil becomes ... an issue of: my feelings or theirs?' '32 Reason is
often invalidated by the arbitrary and subjective whims of society's ruling
agents and ultimately vanquished from the political process." When a
"subjectivist wants to pursue some social idea of his own, he feels morally
entitled to force men 'for their own good,' since he feels that he is right
and that there is nothing to oppose him but their misguided feelings.
'" 34
Driven by its transcendental and non-rational intuitive notions of the social
good, subjectivism is the antithesis to economics' objective theory of
value.
35
32. AYN RAND, CAPrrALIsM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 15 (5th ed. 1966).
33. Id. at 14-15.
34. Id. at 15.
35. See id. at 16.
The recognition of individual rights implies the recognition of the
fact that the good is not an ineffable abstraction in some supernatural
dimension, but a value pertaining to reality, to this earth, to the lives of
individual human beings (note the right to the pursuit of happiness). It
implies that the good cannot be divorced from beneficiaries, that men
are not to be regarded as interchangeable, and that no man or tribe may
attempt to achieve the good of some at the price of the immolation of
others.
The free market represents the social application of an objective
2452010]
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The fallacy of individual subjectivism lies in "the fragmentation of
knowledge."36 Each member of society possesses but a small fraction of
the knowledge possessed by the whole; each is therefore ignorant of the
knowledge upon which the operation of society ultimately rests.
37
Accordingly, it has been said that "the recognition of our ignorance is the
beginning of wisdom," and such recognition "has profound significance
[on] our understanding of society."' 38 It is upon such "unavoidable
ignorance" that civilized society rests. 39 Given such ignorance, it is unreal-
istic to expect individual subjectivism to direct the way to societal
greatness. Disorientation and seemingly endless, non-directional deliber-
ation awaits those who insist on proceeding in the absence of any
objective standard. Thus, the following analysis and discussion are prem-
ised upon a rejection of any subjective, static notion of greatness. The
greatness of a society is not evidenced by the attainment of some discrete,
measurable social value; rather, its greatness is evidenced by the existence
of a dynamic process that maximizes the opportunity for individual well-
theory of values. Since values are to be discovered by man's mind, men
must be free to discover them-to think, to study, to translate their
knowledge into physical form, to offer their products for trade, to judge
them, and to choose, be it material goods or ideas, a loaf of bread or a
philosophical treatise. Since values are established contextually, every
man must judge for himself, in the context of his own knowledge,
goals, and interests. Since values are determined by the nature of
reality, it is reality that serves as men's ultimate arbiter: if a man's
judgment is right, the rewards are his; if it is wrong, he is his only
victim.
Id.
36. F. A. Hayek, Reason and Evolution, in 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:
RULES AND ORDER 8, 14 (1973).
37. Id.
38. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 22.
39. Id. ("Most of the advantages of social life, especially in its more advanced forms
which we call 'civilization,' rest on the fact that the individual benefits from more
knowledge than he is aware of. It might be said that civilization begins when the
individual in the pursuit of his ends can make use of more knowledge than he has himself
acquired and when he can transcend the boundaries of his ignorance by profiting from
knowledge he does not himself possess."); see also Hayek, supra note 36, at 14 ("In
civilized society it is indeed not so much the greater knowledge that the individual can
acquire, as the greater benefit he receives from the knowledge possessed by others, which
is the cause of his ability to pursue an infinitely wider range of ends than merely the
satisfaction of his most pressing physical needs. Indeed, a 'civilized' individual may be
very ignorant, more ignorant than many a savage, and yet greatly benefit from the
civilization in which he lives.").
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being.40 It is from this perspective that the following discussion and
analysis resurrect the neo-classical understanding and use of the term
"great society." 41
B. A Well-Governed Society From Which Occasions Universal Opulence
The underlying premise of the neo-classical economic reformation is
perhaps best summarized by the following observation of Adam Smith: "It
is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-
governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the
lowest ranks of the people.442 3
As a founding "father of modem political economy," Smith iden-
tified the quintessential ingredient and ultimate challenge for the social
40. See generally DANIEL B. KLEIN, ASSURANCE AND TRUST IN A GREAT SOCIETY
(2000).
41. Hayek, supra note 36, at 148 n.l1 ("The expression 'the Great Society,' which
we shall frequently use in the same sense in which we shall use Sir Karl Popper's term
'the Open Society,' was, of course, already familiar in the eighteenth century ... and in
modem times was revived by Graham Wallas when he used it as the title for one of his
books .... It has probably not lost its suitability by its use as a political slogan by a recent
American administration."); see also KLEIN, supra note 40, at 99-120. See generally
DANIEL B. KLEIN, REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD
CONDUCT (1997).
42. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS bk. 1, ch. I, p. 22 (R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund, Inc.
1981) (1976); see also 3 ARTHUR SELDON & F. G. PENNANCE, THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ARTHUR SELDON: EVERYMAN'S DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 221 (Colin Robinson ed.,
Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (1976) ("Adam Smith's influence was profound; he was one of
the first 'academic' economists, bringing together a vast amount of material, producing
from it a systemic analysis and making policy recommendations that have remained
unrivaled in their impact.").
43. ELI GINZBERG, ADAM SMITH AND THE FOUNDING OF MARKET ECONOMICS 8
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1934); see also EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC
SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (2001) ("It was
'since Adam Smith,'... that political economy, defined 'as the science concerned with
wealth,' had been distinguished from the quite different discipline of politics." (quoting
Jean-Baptiste Say)); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 5
(18th ed. 2005) ("Adam Smith is usually considered the founder of the field of micro-
economics, the branch of economics which today is concerned with the behavior of
individual entities such as markets, firms and households. In The Wealth of Nations
(1776), Smith considered how individual prices are set, studied the determination of
prices of land, labor, and capital, and inquired into the strengths and weaknesses of the
market mechanism. Most important, he identified the remarkable efficiency properties of
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creation and sustenance of wealth-the establishment and maintenance of
a well-governed society.44 According to Smith, well-governedness nec-
essarily involves the establishment of governing institutions designed to
nurture a diversity of productive arts from which universal opulence may
be generated to the great favor of the citizenry.45 The challenge lies in the
preservation and maintenance of such a society, and continues to confound
constitutional and institutional architects, scholars, social engineers and
governing policymakers. This challenge is complicated by a sometimes
irreconcilable multiplicity of commercial interests expressed in terms of
special-interest or protectionist politics.
Smith observed a positive but derivative relationship between opul-
ence and ruling institutions. Discouraged with the protectionist and
privileged policies of the mercantilist period, Smith maintained that an
individual is in continued pursuit of maximizing his or her situation, that
such an individual knew better than anyone else how best to succeed in
such a pursuit, and therefore, that the wealth of a nation was the sum of
autonomous and individual productive labor.46 The degree of societal
abundance or plentifulness was, and remains, a function of the institutional
context in which resources are ultimately allocated and utilized in
production.47 It is from this perspective that Political Economy has long
markets and saw that economic benefit comes from the self-interested actions of
individuals. These remain important issues today, and while the study of microeconomics
has surely advanced greatly since Smith's day, he is still cited by politicians and econ-
omists alike."); MARTIN STANILAND, WHAT IS POLITICAL ECONOMY? A STUDY OF
SOCIAL THEORY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 10 (1985) ("Historically, the turning point in
the development of ideas about the relationship of politics to economics clearly occurred
in the eighteenth century.").
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. It merits noting Smith's use of the
term "opulence" in reference to the term "wealth." Of Smith's several impressive literary
con-tributions to the various academies of higher learning, this single passage best
expresses the underlying premise of neo-classical Political Economy.
45. See id.
46. 3 SELDON & PENNANCE, supra note 42, at 220-21.
47. See 1 DAVID RICARDO, THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO:
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 5 (Piero Sraffa & M. H.
Dobb eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2004) (1951) ("The produce of the earth-all that is
derived from its surface by the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is
divided among three classes of the community; namely, the proprietor of the land, the
owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose
industry it is cultivated. But in different stages of society, the proportions of the whole
produce of the earth which will be allotted to each of these classes, under the names of
rent, profit, and wages, will be essentially different; depending mainly on the actual fertil-
ity of the soil, on the accumulation of capital and population, and on the skill, ingenuity,
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acknowledged the relationship between economic theory, the political
process, and the derivation of policy norms.
4 8
C. Free Enterprise and Government-The Intimate, Reciprocating
Relationship Between Law and Economics
One of the academic externalities of the methodological approach
argued below is the continued recognition that the process of law may
indeed be improved if those charged with the authority to promulgate,
administer, and execute its essence acquire a working knowledge of
economics.4 9 The arguments proffered demonstrate that any critical
analysis of a legal process and its governing institutions must not be
performed within a jurisprudential vacuum, devoid of any interdisciplinary
insight or guidance. Use of the term legal process refers to a compre-
hensive, dynamic, and evolving social system, from (and for) which laws
are created, executed, reviewed and revised. Although this Article does
not propose to address each and every aspect of such a dynamic system, it
does nonetheless address limited, generalized aspects from which it will
ultimately offer a hypothesis directly relevant to the execution and
enforcement of any law legitimately promulgated from within such a
and instruments employed in agriculture. To determine the laws which regulate this
distribution is the principal problem in Political Economy . (emphasis added)); see
also James Buchanan, Is Economics the Science of Choice?, in ROADS TO FREEDOM-
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK (Erich Streissler ed., 1969), reprinted
in 12 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN:
ECONOMIC INQUIRY AND rrs LOGIC 3, 13 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2000); id. at 15 ("Since
Adam Smith, economists have been within the bounds of methodological propriety when
they have proposed organizational-institutional arrangements that channel behavior that
may be, but need not be, economically motivated in the direction of promoting what may
be, but need not be, mutually desired economic objectives."); id. at 20 ("During the past
half-century ... theory has been called upon to do much more than [explain the
functioning of a market system]. It has been employed to derive norms for policy aimed
at making allocation more 'efficient."'); STANILAND, supra note 43, at 198 ("There are
various ways of conceptualizing political economy-by which I mean not just any theory
bearing the label, but rather a set of theories concerned with depicting relationships
between political processes and economic processes.").
48. See sources cited id.
49. James M. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974),
reprinted in 18 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN: FEDERALISM,
LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 327, 328 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2001).
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system. The relevance of economics to this analysis rests upon the
fundamental premise that the purpose of social order is utilitarian and that
both public and private utility may consistently and effectively be max-
imized by private action. Thus, this Article proceeds in the interdiscipl-
inary tradition of law and economics, reminding that the "law is far too
important to be left to the lawyers, especially since lawyers come
increasingly to man the corridors of Leviathan."
50
Although the following analysis references and utilizes positive
economic theory,5' its purpose is the identification and derivation of
institutional foundations and normative policy maxims relevant to the
establishment and maintenance of a well-governed society designed to
maximize wealth for all.52 The pursuit of such a well-governed society is a
dynamic and formidable endeavor, especially within a large, commercial,
50. Id.
51. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 43, at 7 ("Positive Economics versus
Normative Economics: in thinking about economic questions, we must distinguish
questions of fact from questions of fairness. Positive economics describes the facts of an
economy, while normative economics involves value judgments."); STANILAND, supra
note 43, at 19 ("'More than any other social science, economics has divested itself of
controversial valuative concerns during the past half century, and has developed a self-
contained, professional discourse. This discourse is seen as primarily that of positive
science and as excluding valuative assertions."' (quoting Duncan MacRae, Jr., Normative
Assumptions in the Study of Public Choice, 16 PUB. CHOICE 27, 28 (1973))); see also
Lionel Robbins, Economics and Political Economy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1981) ("[lIt
is important to recognize that the propositions of economics ... are positive rather than
normative. They deal inter alia with values; but they deal with them as individual or
social facts. The generalizations which emerge are statements of existence or possi-
bility.... There can be events or institutions having an economic aspect which we
ourselves regard as ethically acceptable or unacceptable. But, in so far as the explanations
to their causes or consequences are scientific, they are neutral in this respect.").
52. See STANILAND, supra note 43, at 33 ("[T]he logical basis of welfare economics
[is] flawed, [and it is] impossible to arrive at a scientific definition of the general good
from an examination of individual preferences. But governments [have] to make
judgments about such matters, and values [are] inescapably involved in such judgments.
Therefore, [the field should be divided] into 'political economy,' which [deals] with such
important, but essentially unscientific matters, and 'economic science,' which would
continue the central, normatively neutral tasks of analyzing the facts of economic
behavior."); see also Robbins, supra note 51, at 5-8 (Political Economy would cover
"that part of our sphere of interest which essentially involves judgments of value.
Political Economy, thus conceived, is quite unashamedly concerned with the assumptions
of policy and the results flowing from them.").
250
FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE RULE OF LAW
constitutional republic driven by the institutional forces of competition,
special interest politics, and class conflicts. Yet its creation, maintenance,
and preservation are just as imperative today as they were at the founding
of the laissez-faire, political economies spawned by the American and
French Revolutions of the 18th century. It is said that the modem world of
the 21st century is characteristically similar in many ways to "[t]he half
century from the 1770s to the 1820s ... [which was] a time of enthusiasm
and fear in economic life; of excitement over the projects of merchants
and manufacturers, resentment over restrictions on buying and selling,
confidence in the 'liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice' ....
Freedom of commerce was, and remains, the mantra of "classical
liberals" 54 whose rhetoric "is as conspicuous now as it was in the period
that preceded and followed the [American and] French Revolution[s]. '55
The ascent to a well-governed society starts with an understanding that it
is the relationship between the institutions of free enterprise and
government that begets an enterprising environment of freedom and
opulence. 56 Understanding such a relationship is the province of the
political economist;57 the artful intellectual tool of the political economist
is his or her interdisciplinary knowledge of law and economics and their
intimate, reciprocating relationship with one another.
53. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 1.
54. BRIAN DOHERTY, RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENT 6 (2007) (explaining that classical liberals
were "thinkers who believed a harmony of interests is manifest in unrestricted markets,
that free trade can prevent war and make us all richer, that decentralized private property
ownership helps create a spontaneous order of rich variety").
55. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 2.
56. See Arthur Seldon, The "Vision" of Capitalism, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ARTHUR SELDON: THE VIRTUES OF CAPITALISM 280, 289 (Colin Robinson ed., Liberty
Fund, Inc. 2004) (1990) ("The political requirement of capitalism, government that
liberates the market, is the relationship between the government and the market.
see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) ("A
prosperous commerce is now perceived and acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen,
to be the most useful, as well as the most productive, source of national wealth; and has
accordingly become a primary object of their political cares.").
57. See JAMES E. ALT & K. ALEC CHRYSTAL, POLITICAL ECONOMICS 13 (1983) ("A
central issue of political economy is now, and always has been, the role of uncontrolled
'market' forces versus 'political' or government intervention.").
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D. Political Economy and its Diagnostic and Remedial Purposes
58
From its inception as an independent but interdisciplinary science,
Political Economy was aptly explained by one of its founding patrons as
an inquiry into social wealth creation:
Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman
or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful
revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them
to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly,
to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the
publick [sic] services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the
sovereign.
59
The units of analysis of the Political Economy inquiry include "the
laws which regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of
wealth. While Political Economy is often thought of as an inquiry into
the nature and causes of wealth,61 some have more intricately defined it as
a jurisprudential "enquiry [sic] into the laws which determine the division
of the produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its
formation.' 62 Accordingly, analysis of the promulgation, execution, and
58. STANILAND, supra note 43, at 3. In explaining the interdisciplinary nature of
Political Economy, Staniland asserts that "it recognizes the connection between politics
and economics and thus transcends the narrow assumptions of economics and political
science." Id.; see also Buchanan, What Should Economists Do?, supra note 2, at 40
("Economics is the study of the whole system of exchange relationships. Politics is the
study of the whole system of coercive or potentially coercive relationships. In almost any
particular social institution, there are elements of both types of behavior, and it is
appropriate that both the economist and the political scientist study such institutions.").
59. 1 SMITH, supra note 42, at bk. IV, p. 138.
60. John Stuart Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of
"Investigation Proper to It", in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1824-1845, at 309, 313 (J. M. Robson ed., Liberty Fund, Inc.
2006) (1967).
61. See, e.g., 1 SMITH, supra note 42, at bk. II, ch. v, p. 372. ("But the great object of
the political economy of every country, is to encrease [sic] the riches and power of that
country."); see also Letter from T. R. Malthus to David Ricardo (Jan. 26, 1817), in 7 THE
WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO: LETTERS 1816-1818, at 121, 122
(Piero Sraffa ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2004) (1951) ("I really think that the progress of
society consists of irregular movements, and that to omit the consideration of causes
which for eight or ten years will give a great stimulus to production and population, or a
great check to them, is to omit the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations-the grand
object of all enquiries [sic] in Political Economy.").
62. Letter from David Ricardo to T. R. Malthus (Oct. 9, 1820), in 8 THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO: LErERS 1819-1821, at 276, 278 (Piero Sraffa
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jurisprudential administration of the rule of law is within the province of
the neo-classical political economist. Smith's great inquiry, for example,
focused as much on the institutional relevance of a multiplicity of
governing "interests, prejudices, laws and customs" 63 as on the essence
and causation of social wealth creation.64 The political economist often
finds him or herself in pursuit of the underlying institutional causes of
political and economic disorder jeopardizing or obstructing the neo-
classical goal of wealth maximization.
65
Nobel Laureate James Buchanan analogized the political economist's
task to that of "the role of the medical diagnostician." 66 Like the medical
diagnostician, the political economist "isolates an 'illness' or rather what
he believes to be an 'illness' through his knowledge of the system" and
prescribes a remedy. 67 "This remedy is a hypothesis advanced by the
diagnostician. If the illness persists, an alternative remedy is suggested and
the first hypothesis discarded. The process continues until the patient is
restored to health or the existence of no solution is accepted., 68 It is from
this neo-classical, Political Economy perspective that this Article observes
artificial, exogenous influences that ultimately jeopardize the efficiencies
necessary to maximize the creation of wealth within a liberal, constitu-
tional commercial republic. This Article: (1) identifies what it asserts to be
an "illness" injurious to the laissez-faire system of social order, and (2)
prescribes a hypothesis for the purpose of remedying the same. The
diagnostic tool utilized in the analysis is forged in economic theory. By
ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2004) (1951).
63. 1 SMrrH, supra note 42, at bk. I, ch. x, pt. II, p. 145 ("The interests, prejudices,
laws and customs which have given occasion to [the attainment of considerable
opulence], I shall endeavour to explain as fully and distinctly as I can in the third and
fourth books of this enquiry [sic].").
64. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 111.
65. Letter from Hutches Trower to David Ricardo (Sept. 29, 1820), in 8 THE WORKS
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO, supra note 62, at 270 ("The Science of
Political Economy owes its interest, and its importance, to its teaching us to trace to their
true causes the disorders, which are constantly occurring in the course of human affairs,
and thus enabling us to avoid the evils they occasion, by ascertaining the symptoms by
which they are to be distinguished.").
66. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy,
supra note 2, at 196 ('The patient is observed to be ill; a remedy is prescribed. This
remedy is a hypothesis advanced by the diagnostician. If the illness persists, an alter-
native remedy is suggested and the first hypothesis discarded. The process continues until
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reiterating several of the fundamental principles of laissez-faire economics
and their causal relationship with the creation of wealth, this Article
unveils explicit disordering influences that jeopardize the promotion of the
general welfare; by identifying such contravening influences, this Article
further reveals normative policy standards relevant to the administration of
a constitutional, commercial republic governed by the rule of law.
E. Ceteris Paribus-A Critical Nexus Between Theoretical Economics and
the Jurisprudential Administration of a Well-Governed Society
The arguments proffered in this Article are grounded on the premise
that the underlying principles of neo-classical, laissez-faire economics are
instructive with respect to the normative tenets that should guide, if not
drive, a well-governed society.69 Although the following discussion
identifies several such positive principles and their related normative
implications, the emphasis and focus of this Article is on only one such
principle-namely ceteris paribus. While often mentioned within the
positive description of the perfectly competitive economic model
(microeconomics' formalization of neo-classical, laissez-faire economic
theory), the ceteris paribus assumption (or condition) is rarely discussed
with any degree of completeness. This Article demonstrates that the
ceteris paribus assumption/condition provides a critical nexus between
applicable theoretical economic constructs and the jurisprudence of the
rule of law; it analytically bridges the law and economics of a well-
governed society.
It is important to acknowledge that the generalized laws of micro-
economics constitute ceteris paribus laws, that is, their explanatory and
predictive power requires that all non-theoretical economic influences
identified as relevant remain equal. In the alternative, the explanatory and
predictive power of such generalized laws assumes an absence of all other
influences that might disturb their axiomatic expectations. From its
69. For example, one of the operational conditions for perfect competition to thrive
and produce the efficiencies for which it is highly touted is that there should be no
barriers to entry or exit into the marketplace of opportunities. The presence of arbitrary
barriers obstructs the operational efficiencies of the perfectly competitive model. Thus,
this positive theoretical condition drives the normative policy values grounded on libert-
arian interests and prohibitions against artificial prejudice and discriminatory conduct in
the marketplace. Another operational condition for perfect competition to thrive is that all
market participants be fully informed; this drives normative policy values grounded on
rational choice interests and prohibitions against false, inaccurate and even fraudulent
marketplace communications.
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positivist tradition, economic theory teaches that if all of the operational
conditions of the perfectly competitive model hold, then certain effic-
iencies may be achieved to the favor of a wealth-seeking society-ceteris
paribus (assuming all other things remain equal or the absence of all other
disturbing influences). It is from this positive theoretical construct that
normative tenets regarding the maintenance of a well-governed society
may be derived. Specifically (and normatively), a well-governed society
requires the zealous identification and elimination of any and all
asymmetrical, disturbing market influences that may jeopardize the
wealth-creating power of free enterprise. The elimination of such influ-
ences is critical to the preservation of ceteris paribus and a necessary
condition for microeconomics' model of perfect competition to thrive.
F. The Ceteris Paribus and Rule of Law Hypothesis: The Asymmetrical
Application, Adherence or Enforcement of the Rule of Law Encumbers
the Efficiencies of the Laissez-Faire Marketplace
Extrapolating from the perfectly competitive model's requirement of
ceteris paribus, this Article observes that the asymmetrical application,
adherence, or enforcement of relevant governing laws, regulations, and
rules eliminates any possibility that all other influences with respect to the
model's performance values have been neutralized. Rather, such asym-
metrical enforcement practices have a disturbing influence on the model's
ultimate performance. Consequently, it may be normatively inferred that
the axiomatic nature of the perfectly competitive model requires that all
market participants be equally subject to the same geopolitical institutional
rules, regulations, and conventions. To the extent that different rules,
regulations, and conventions apply to competing participants within a
single market, such differences will likely have an isolated and disturbing
influence on the generalized laws of microeconomics. Or, alternatively
stated, the extent that market rules and regulations are not equally applied
to all market participants, the assumption (or condition) of ceteris paribus
is violated; the unequal application of laws and regulations relevant to the
market will undoubtedly have disturbing influences on the generalized
axioms of the perfectly economic model.
This Article concludes by testing its ceteris paribus hypothesis with
the use of game theory constructs. Free enterprise, as more formally
described by economics' model of perfect competition, has long been
viewed to be a dynamic, social process "wholly analogous to a game,
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namely a game partly of skill and partly of chance." 70 Game theory
demonstrates that, when the rule of law is imperfectly or unequally
enforced (regardless of whether it is a just or unjust rule), the productive
energies of free enterprise are diminished. Wealth-creation stalls. The
exchange process is mired with uncertainty and insecurity. The causal link
between liberty, autonomous individual action, and the establishment of a
well-governed society capable of generating universal opulence is broken.
The analysis that follows demonstrates what should be obvious, but is
nonetheless often ignored: a well-governed society requires that once a
rule of law is lawfully promulgated, and for as long as it remains
operational within its relevant jurisdiction, it must be equally and uni-
formly enforced with respect to all market participants. Free enterprise
mandates such an enforcement paradigm. The absence of equal and
uniform enforcement ultimately obstructs the enterprising nature of free
enterprise's spontaneous order; its proficiencies with respect to the
manifestation of societal opulence are supplanted by the inefficiencies of
arbitrary, capricious privilege and discriminatory advantage. Such an
enforcement paradigm "necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of
the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted
in the service of some coalition of organized interests."
71
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF FREE ENTERPRISE
A. Free Enterprise and its Great Promise
Although often used to mechanically reference "a system in which the
non-human factors of production are owned privately and used to earn
profits for their owners by producing goods and services to sell directly or
indirectly to consumers,"' 2 the term free enterprise is remarkably robust in
meaning and implication. Free enterprise is characteristically and fund-
amentally grounded in principles of liberty and limited government,
70. See F. A. Hayek, "Social" or Distributive Justice, in 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 62, 71 (1976).
71. Hayek, Introduction, in 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER,
supra note 36, at 2. While Professor Hayek's observation was made generally with
respect to "the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions," his observation is
appropriately applicable to the finite thesis of this paper. Id.
72. See 3 SELDON & PENNANCE, supra note 42, at 281-82 ("The two distinctive
features of free enterprise are the private ownership of property and the bearing of the
risks and uncertainties of production by entrepreneurs." (emphasis in original)).
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actualized within a delicate framework of laws designed to create and
nurture institutions of private property, individualism, competitive free
markets, and autonomous choice.73 It is a system fueled by individualism
and libertarianism and structurally preserved within a jurisprudential
framework of laws, and, assuming a proper balance between libertar-
ianism and its governing institutions, free enterprise is a wealth-creating
system capable of generating the universal opulence referenced by Smith
and his neo-classical peers.
Libertarianism is based in economic theory, as economic science
teaches how workable order can arise from seeming chaos of free actions
uncoordinated by a single outside intelligence, and how government
intervention is apt to upset that balance. It is based in moral theory,
positing what is or is not right when it comes to a human being, or group
of human beings, using force or coercion on another. It is based in
political theory, exploring the likely effects of granting human beings
power over others. It is ultimately a delicate ecological balance of all
these, with history in the mix as well, to further understand how the
constant struggle of liberty versus power tends to play out in the real
world.75
And yet, free enterprise was, and remains, a radical term. 76 It refers to
"[t]he great promise of a commercial and liberal society-of the liberal
plan of equality, liberty and justice."77 It is a means to several ends. Upon
its introduction, free enterprise cultivated a courageous and reforming
sense of individualism critical to the abolition of an oppressive feudalistic
system sustained by fear and insecurity. 78 It promoted opportunistic,
73. See id. at 282 ("The system is 'free' from detailed state regulation and direction
but is subject to a framework of laws on property, contract, sale of goods, companies,
restraint of trade, patents, copyright and so on designed to create and maintain the
institutions of private property, decentralized initiative, free markets, competition and
consumer choice.").
74. See id. at 221. The forty years or so following publication of Smith's Wealth of
Nations "saw the rise of the 'classical' school of economics in Great Britain. Its main
ideas tended to be refinements of Adam Smith's thinking, but they were based on [the
works of] ... Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) ... Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) and David
Ricardo (1772-1823)." Id.
75. DOHERTY, supra note 54, at 15; see also STANILAND, supra note 43, at 18
(referencing "the original reforming mission of political economy").
76. DOHERTY, supra note 54, at 15.
77. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 14.
78. See id. at 12-13 ("The feudal governments of Europe were founded on fear. In the
unfortunate countries where individuals lived 'under all the violence of the feudal
institutions,' tenants and tradesmen subsisted in continuing insecurity. Their leases were
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political, and economic institutions that supplanted the social barriers and
restraints imposed by mercantilist or aristocratic protectionism and priv-
ilege.79 It rescued Western civilization from the "shortcomings, abuses and
corruptions of the mercantilist guild system-a medieval form of state-
supervised corporativism .... 0 Driven by a "belief in the power and
rightness of liberty and free markets," it served not only as a catalyst of
wealth creation, but also as an instrument of liberty and individual indep-
81endence. Its radical, enlightened, and progressive historical influence
may be best illustrated by the following observation:
The progress of markets and wealth in the past centuries has eliminated
many aspects of day-to-day early American life that strike us today as
tyrannical, from the sharp distinctions of rank, the religion-based social
control in the towns, and of course the most prominent stain on
America's libertarian heritage, the status of blacks and women ....
[T]he history of Western civilization and Western liberty has been the
shift from status to contract-from being locked into position based on
who you were at birth, to being able to live, work, do what you wish,
deal with others as you please, based on mutually binding contracts-
commercial, residential, or marital--chosen by both parties.
82
Given the robust and rich socio-economic implications of free enter-
prise, one is reminded to pause and emphasize that its simple principles
are fueled by a delicate and reciprocating relationship between liberty, the
state, and wealth creation:
The private-ownership, market economy "works better" than the
socialised [sic] economy; it produces more goods. But, and at the same
time, it allows individuals more liberty to choose where, when and to
precarious. They were obliged to provide arbitrary and irregular services to their land-
lords and to the state.").
79. See also 3 SELDON & PENNANCE, supra note 42, at 220-21 ("The work of the
'Physiocrats,' or 'les 6conomistes' as they were known to their contemporaries, was imp-
ortant mainly because it focused attention on the production of wealth and recommended
increased liberalization in the economic policy of the state .... Adam Smith (1723-90),
was a contemporary of the Physiocrats and agreed with their views on the liberty of the
individual in economic society .... The period was the Industrial Revolution in Great
Britain, but the emerging commercial and manufacturing classes were bound, at least
nominally, by numerous regulations left over from the 'mercantilist' period. The
automatic, 'natural' mechanism outlined by Adam Smith seemed to indicate that these
controls should be swept away and replaced by 'laissez-faire,' or confining the economic
role of the state to that of maintaining competition.").
80. Arthur Seldon, Market Success: Curable Defects, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ARTHUR SELDON: THE VIRTUES OF CAPrrALISM, supra note 56, at 15.
81. DOHERTY, supra note 54, at 24-25.
82. Id. at 25-26.
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what purpose they will put their capacities to produce values that they
expect others to demand. Should we be surprised, therefore, when our
history texts tell us about the genuine excitement that the discovery of
the principles of classical political economy generated? Only with the
philosophers of the 18th century did it come to be understood, for the
first time, that the private-ownership economy could, indeed, make
nations wealthy, but, at the same time, could ensure persons the liberty
to make their own choices. These were heady ideas; it is little wonder
that several generations of intellectual and political leaders were so
aroused. Persons could be free from coercion by other persons and get
rich at the same time, provided only that the state organised [sic] the
legal-political framework for protection of private properties and for
the enforcement of voluntary contracts.
83
From its inception, free enterprise redefined the role of governments.84
Rather than subject the allocation of resources to the whims of govern-
mental authority (and therefore miscalculation), free enterprise optim-
istically proposed that the allocation of societal resources be the subject of
private and voluntary exchange processes. 85 The efficiency of the
"invisible hand ' 86 replaced the inefficiency of centralized planning and
direction. The essential instrument driving free enterprise to reach stan-
dards of living envisioned by Smith and his neo-classical peers is the
83. James M. Buchanan, Socialism is Dead but Leviathan Lives On, in 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, supra note 2, at 179, 182.
84. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS bk. IV, ch. ix, p. 687 (R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner, eds., Liberty Fund, Inc.
1981) (1976) ("The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in attempting to
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper
performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty
of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employ-
ments most suitable to the interest of the society.").
85. ALT & CHRYSTAL, supra note 57, at 14-15.
86. 1 SMITH, supra note 42, at bk. IV, ch. ii, p. 456 ("As every individual, therefore,
endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestick [sic]
industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he
can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick [sic] interest, nor knows
how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestick [sic] to that of
foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he
is in this, as in many other cases, led by the invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it.
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it." (emphasis added)).
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pricing system of a free market,8 7 which is ultimately "formalized into the
perfect competition model of economics.
' 8
B. The Formalization of Laissez-Faire Economics
1. Scarcity and Economics' Model of Perfect Competition
Economic theory89 has long acknowledged that liberty, especially as it
pertains to individual choice with respect to consumption and production,
is constrained by scarcity, and that such scarcity is the fundamental source
of social and political conflict.90 Scarcity drives the need for private and
public choice, and such choice often breeds conflict.91 Given such
scarcity, all societies are confronted with the following choices: "(1)
What, and how much, to produce; (2) how to produce it; and (3) for whom
to produce it."92 Economics has demonstrated that the adoption of the
perfectly competitive model provides a remarkable social mechanism with
which to administer the social problems generated by scarcity. The
perfectly competitive model ultimately nurtures efficiencies in the alloca-
93tion, production, and distribution of scarce resources.
87. Arthur Seldon, The Capitalist Open Secret, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ARTHUR SELDON: THE VIRTUES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 56, at 184.
88. ALT & CHRYSTAL, supra note 57, at 15.
89. See GARY S. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY viii (1971). Although the field of
economics has traditionally treated micro and macroeconomics as two distinct and sep-
arate subfields, this Article proceeds with the general reference to economics and econ-
omic theory as opposed to microeconomics, and adopts Professor Becker's "belief that
there is only one kind of economic theory, not separate theories for micro problems,
macro problems, nonmarket decisions and so on." Id.
90. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 5 (5th ed. 2004).
91. See Buchanan, supra note 47, at 4 ("To the economist, choice seems to be
imposed by the fact of scarcity. Given an acknowledged multiplicity of ends and a
limitation on means, it becomes necessary that some selection among alternatives be
made. It is in such a very general setting that economics has been classified as the study
of such selection, or choice.").
92. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 5; see also Buchanan, What Should Economists
Do?, supra note 2, at 30 ("The economic problem involves the allocation of scarce means
among alternative or competing ends. The problem is one of allocation, made necessary
by the fact of scarcity, the necessity to choose.").
93. 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 402b (3d ed.
2007) ("A perfectly competitive economy produces an equilibrium that yields efficient
use of resources in both the productive and the allocative senses. Productive efficiency
means that firms maximize operating efficiency by producing all goods and services at
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As Figure 1 above demonstrates, the unfettered forces of supply and
demand determine an efficient quantity of production for any given good
or service (Qe), as well as a market clearing price with respect to same
(Pe)9 4-the market achieves equilibrium. In neo-classical, Political Econ-
omy terms, such unfettered forces minimize waste caused by miscalcula-
tions with respect to levels of production and consumption. In equilibrium,
there is little, if any, waste resulting from the over- or under-production or
consumption. In equilibrium, universal opulence is maximized.
least cost. Allocative efficiency entails that resources are so allocated among the prod-
uction of various goods and services so that no reallocation of inputs and outputs could
increase aggregate consumer welfare by making some consumers better off without
making others worse off.").
94. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBnFELD, MICROECONOMICS 23-24 (5th
ed. 2001) ("The two curves intersect at the equilibrium, or market-clearing price and
quantity .... The market mechanism is the tendency in a free market for the price to
change until the market clears-i.e., until the quantity supplied and the quantity dema-
nded are equal. At this point, because there is neither excess demand nor excess supply,
there is no pressure for the price to change further. Supply and demand might not always
be in equilibrium, and some markets might not clear quickly when conditions change
suddenly. The tendency, however, is for markets to clear." (emphasis in original)).
THE UNFETrERED FORCES OF SUPPLY AND DEMANDFigure I
P
PC
Supply = Y MC
Demand
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2. Price Theory and the Unfettered Forces of Supply and Demand
Figure 1 illustrates market demand and supply curves for a given good
in a competitive market. The firm's individual supply curve is derived
from its marginal cost curve;95 that is, as long as the market price for a
given good equals or exceeds the marginal cost to produce that good, a
96firm will produce and supply that given good. The market or industry
supply curve is derived from the horizontal summation of all the marginal
cost curves of the competing individual firms, which is the same as the
horizontal summation of the individual firm supply curves. 97 The industry
or market supply curve reflects the schedule of prices at which firms are
willing to supply a given quantity of any good or service. As price in-
creases, rational firms are willing to supply more and more, and the more
the market or industry is willing to supply. Given the positive relationship
between the price of a good or service and the quantity supplied, the slope
of the market or industry supply curve is also positive. 98 The industry or
95. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 43, at 125-26 ("Marginal cost is one
of the most important concepts in all of economics. Marginal cost (MC) denotes the extra
or additional cost of producing one extra unit of output."); see also infra notes 138-39
and accompanying text.
96. See generally W. KIP VIscUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 79-82 (4th ed. 2005). 'The individual
firms' supply curves are their marginal cost curves; hence we can think of the supply
curve ... as the industry's marginal cost curve." Id. at 80; see also COLANDER, supra note
90, at 247 ("Since the marginal cost curve tells the firm how much to produce, the
marginal cost curve is the perfectly competitive firm's supply curve."); PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 263 ("[T]he firm's supply curve is the portion of the
marginal cost curve that lies above the average economic cost curve." (emphasis in
original)); infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
97. VIscusI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 96, at 80 ("The competitive
industry's supply curve is found by horizontal aggregation of the supply curves of
individual firms."); see also COLANDER, supra note 90, at 249 ("In the short run when the
number of firms in the market is fixed, the market supply curve is just the horizontal sum
of all the firms' marginal cost curves, taking account of any changes in input prices that
might occur." (emphasis in original)); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 267,
fig.8.9 ('The short-run industry supply curve is the summation of the supply curves of the
individual firms."); see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
98. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 43, at 51 ("One important reason for
the upward slope is 'the law of diminishing returns' .... Wine will illustrate this im-
portant law. If society wants more wine, then additional labor will have to be added to the
limited land sites suitable for producing wine grapes. Each new worker will be adding
less and less extra product. The price needed to coax out additional wine output is there-
fore higher. By raising the price of wine, society can persuade wine producers to produce
and sell more wine; the supply curve for wine is therefore upward-sloping.").
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market demand curve can be "viewed as a schedule of the marginal
willingness-to-pay of customers." 99 In Figure 1 above, the competitive
equilibrium price (Pe) equals the industry's marginal cost of production at
the equilibrium output (Q,).100 Should the market only produce Q' units of
the good or service in question, economic waste results because the mar-
ginal willingness-to-pay exceeds the marginal cost to produce additional
units of the good or service. Should the market produce Q'- units of the
good or service in question, economic waste results because the marginal
cost to produce Q' units exceeds the marginal willingness-to-pay. Figure
1 ultimately demonstrates that the unfettered forces of supply and demand
in a perfectly competitive market determine a market clearing quantity
(Qe) and a corresponding price (Pe), thereby answering the profound
political and economic questions of what and how much society should
produce of a given good or service given the constraints of scarcity.
In equilibrium, price will equal marginal cost for all goods and ser-
vices, and rates of return (adjusted for risk) on investment in the various
markets will be equal and sufficient to maintain investment at current
levels. Since each price reflects the value of each product to the marginal
buyer, and since each price equals the cost of the marginal unit of output,
consumer welfare is maximized; any rearrangement of inputs and outputs
can only decrease the aggregate value of what consumers receive. 101
3. Axiomatic Efficiency Yields-The Creation and Sustenance of
Universal Opulence
Perfect competition minimizes waste by minimizing the risk of under-
or over-production; supply equals demand, and resources are allocated and
distributed to those who value them most. By eliminating waste and
maximizing production, the ends of government are optimized-the pro-
motion of the general welfare for the greatest number by the creation and
sustenance of "that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest
ranks of the people."'
10 2
99. VIsCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 96, at 81.
100. See id.
101. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 93, 402b2.
102. See 1 SMrrH, supra note 42, at bk. 1, ch. i, p. 22; see also John Adams, Thoughts
on Government (Apr. 1776), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION: MAJOR
THEMES 107, 108 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("We ought to consider,
what is the end of government, before we determine which is the best form. Upon this
point all speculative politicians will agree, that the happiness of society is the end of
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C. The Operational Conditions of Microeconomics' Model of Perfect
Competition
The underlying assumptions, or the antecedent conditions, of the per-
fectly competitive model 0 3 essentially consist of the following:
1. There are numerous buyers and sellers, 10 4 that each act
independently' 0 5 and rationally; 
106
government, as all Divines and moral Philosophers will agree that the happiness of the
individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow, that the form of govern-
ment, which communicates ease, comfort, security, or in one word happiness to the
greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best."); see also THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("W[e] hold these Truths to be self-
evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deri-
ving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness." (emphasis added)).
103. See COLANDER, supra note 90, at 239 (outlining the "necessary conditions for
perfect competition").
104. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 13 (2004) ("When the number of participants becomes really great,
some hope emerges that the influence of every particular participant will become negli-
gible, and that the above difficulties may recede and a more conventional theory become
possible. These are, of course, the classical conditions of 'free competition.' Indeed, this
was the starting point of much of what is best in economic theory."); see also EDWIN
MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATIONS 356-57 (11 th ed.
2004) ("The firm in a perfectly competitive market has so many rivals that competition
becomes impersonal in the extreme .... A competitive firm faces so little of the market
demand that its effective demand curve is horizontal at whatever price the market will
bear. A competitive firm can decide only the output that it would like to supply to the
market given that price."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 327 ("In a perfectly
competitive market, the large number of sellers and buyers of a good ensures that no
single seller or buyer can affect its price. The market forces of supply and demand
determine price.").
105. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 430 ("In [competitive] markets,
each firm could take price or market demand as given and largely ignore its competitors.
In an oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets price or output based partly on strategic
considerations regarding the behavior of its competitors."); see also 2B AREEDA,
HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 93, 402a ("Each seller and buyer makes decisions
independently, without agreement with or influence from others."); MANSFIELD & YOHE,
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2. Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such a
negligible amount of the total output such that no one
buyer or seller can influence price by the amount they
either consume or produce;
10 7
3. There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect to
consumer or producer markets;
10 8
4. All market participants-all buyers and sellers-are
fully informed of all relevant economic and
technological data; 1
09
supra note 104, at 426 ("Unlike the case of ... competition, the supply side of an olig-
opoly market is composed of a few firms."); Id. at 433-34 ("Conditions in oligopolistic
industries tend to promote collusion, since the number of firms is small and the firms
recognize their interdependence. The advantages to the firms of collusion seem obvious:
increased profits, decreased uncertainty, and a better opportunity to prevent others'
entry.").
106. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS 634 (6th ed. 2005)
("[Tihe economist assumes that people are rational."); see also supra note 43 and
accompanying text (discussing rational choice as an equimarginal principle).
107. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 252 ("Because each individualfirm
sells a sufficiently small proportion of total market output, its decisions have no impact
on market price .... The assumption of price taking applies to consumers as well as
firms." (emphasis in original)); see also 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note
93, 402a ("Sellers and buyers are so numerous that no individual's output or purchasing
decision has any perceptible impact on output or price."); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra
note 104, at 290 ("[Plerfect competition requires that each participant in the market,
whether a buyer or a seller, be so small in relation to the entire market that he or she
cannot affect the product's price." (emphasis in original)).
108. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 253 ("[F]ree entry (exit), means
that there are no special costs that make it difficult for a new firm either to enter an
industry and produce or to exit if it cannot make a profit. As a result, buyers can easily
switch from one supplier to another, and suppliers can easily enter or exit a market."
(emphasis in original)); see also 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 93,
402a ("All productive resources are freely mobile among markets; there are no barriers to
entry or exit."); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 290 ("Perfect competition also
requires that all resources be completely mobile. Each resource must, in other words, be
able to enter or leave the market with ease and to switch from one use to another without
fuss or bother." (emphasis in original)).
109. See PINDYCK & RUBENFELD, supra note 94, at 595 ("[W]e have assumed that
consumers and producers have complete information about the economic variables that
are relevant for the choices they face."); see also 2B AREEDA, HOvENKAMP & SOLOW,
supra note 93, 402a ("All sellers and buyers have sufficient knowledge of all
production techniques, input costs, prices, and other relevant market facts."); MANSFIELD
& YOHE, supra note 104, at 290-91 ("[Plerfect competition requires that consumers,
firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of the relevant economic and
technological data. Consumers must be aware of all prices. Laborers and owners of
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5. All products are homogeneous and constitute inter-
changeable substitutes for each other;" 0
6. The forces of supply and demand are free to determine
the quantity of output in a relevant market as well as
determine a market-clearing, competitive price with
respect to same;"
7. All other influences relevant to the perfectly com-
petitive model's performance are equal, or ceteris
paribus;112 and
8. Well-defined individual rights are secured by the
universal and equal application of the rule of law. 113
capital must be aware of how much their resources will bring in all possible uses. Firms
must know prices of all inputs and the characteristics of all relevant technologies. And in
its purest sense, perfect competition requires that all of these economic decision-making
units have an accurate knowledge of the past, the present, and the future.").
110. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 252-53 ("Price-taking behavior
typically occurs in markets where firms produce identical, or nearly identical, products.
When the products of all of the firms in a market are perfectly substitutable with one
another-that is, when they are homogeneous-no firm can raise the price of its product
above the price of other firms without losing most or all of its business."); see also
MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 405 (In perfectly competitive situations "[t]here
are large number of firms producing and selling ... goods that are ... completely
homogeneous.
111. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 55 ("The market mechanism is the
tendency for supply and demand to equilibrate (i.e., for price to move to the market-
clearing level), so that there is neither excess demand nor excess supply."); see also
MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 347-48 ("[A] perfectly competitive economy
maximizes the total net gain of consumers and producers .... [Djeadweight losses-
reductions in economic efficiency-result if the government [obstructs the forces of
supply and demand by imposing] a price ceiling .... a price floor ..., a tariff, a quota, or
an excise tax.").
112. See WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLIC-
ATION 55-56 (9th ed. 2004) [hereinafter NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS]
("Much economic analysis is based on this ceteris paribus (other things being equal)
assumption. [For example, w]e can simplify the analysis of a person's consumption
decisions by assuming that satisfaction is affected only by choices made among the
options being considered. All other effects on satisfaction are assumed to remain
constant. In this way we can isolate the economic factors that affect consumption
behavior. This narrow focus is not intended to imply that other things that affect utility
are unimportant; we are conceptually holding these other factors constant so that we may
study choices in a simplified setting." (emphasis in original)); see also WALTER
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 649 (9th ed.
2005) [hereinafter NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY] (defining "ceteris paribus" as
"[t]he assumption that all other relevant factors are held constant when examining the
influence of one particular variable in an economic model").
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Positive microeconomic theory teaches that if these conditions hold,
the perfectly competitive model will create efficiencies in consumption,
production, and allocation.1 1 4 It is through the creation of such efficiencies
that a perfectly competitive market promises the greatest social opp-
ortunity for wealth creation. Ultimately, it promises greater output at lower
prices. 15 Normative microeconomic theory teaches that it is from these
referenced operational conditions that the political economist can derive
guidelines for structuring a well-governed society capable of generating
the greatest opulence for the greatest number.1lrTo the extent that the
political economist observes a sociological phenomenon that violates or
impedes any of the above referenced conditions, such phenomenon must
be eliminated or at least minimized. For example, if it is the goal of
society to minimize waste in a world haunted by scarcity, then govern-
mental price controls should be discouraged, if not prohibited, because
they directly interfere with the unfettered, wealth-creating forces of supply
and demand.
D. The "Scarcity-Choice Maximization Nexus" 117
Central to the perfectly competitive model is the assumption that all
market participants are rational, with rational action being defined by the
principles of utility or profit maximization. 118 Competing, scarce altern-
113. See infra Part III.
114. See VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 104, at 14 ("The current
assertions concerning free competition appear to be very valuable surmises and inspiring
anticipations of results. But they are not results and it is scientifically unsound to treat
them as such as long as the conditions which we mentioned above are not satisfied.").
115. See Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Antitrust
law condemns practices that drive up prices by curtailing output.").
116. MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 7 (2008) ("Economics is sometimes divided
into two parts: positive economics and normative economics. The former deals with how
the economic problem is solved; the latter deals with how the economic problem should
be solved." (emphasis in original)).
117. See Buchanan, supra note 47, at 19. In coining the phrase "the scarcity-choice
maximization nexus," Professor Buchanan illustrates economic rationality as an act of
utility maximization within the limits of the field economics' analytical models. Id. at 13-
21.
118. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 245 ('The goal of a firm is to maximize profits.");
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 254 ('The assumption of profit maximization is
frequently used in microeconomics because it predicts business behavior reasonably
accurately and avoids unnecessary analytical complications."); see MANSFIELD & YOHE,
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atives necessitate the need for economic choice. Such choice "involves the
simple principle of economizing .. ,119 Any act of consumption or prod-
uction that fails to maximize the utility or profit of an individual or firm is
considered to be irrational economic behavior. Consequently, in order to
act rationally, all market participants must be fully informed of all costs
and benefits associated with their respective economic activities. 120 Once
informed, an economically rational actor will weigh his or her costs and
benefits, and if the benefits exceed or equal his or her costs, he or she will
engage in such activity. 12 1 Consumers choose consumption levels that
maximize their interpersonal utility (i.e., satisfaction), given their specific
budget constraints. 122 Consumer utility is maximized where the marginal
supra note 104, at 44. Given the consumer's tastes and preferences, economists assume
that he or she is rational, in the sense that he or she tries to "maximize utility." Id.; see
also COLANDER, supra note 90, at 175 ("The analysis of rational choice is the analysis of
how individuals choose goods within their budget in order to maximize total utility, and
how maximizing total utility can be accomplished by considering marginal utility. That
analysis begins with the premise that rational individuals want as much satisfaction as
they can get from their available resources. The term rational in economics means,
specifically, that people prefer more to less and will make choices that give them as much
satisfaction as possible." (emphasis in original)); LANDSBURG, supra note 106, at 634
("The economist assumes that people act according to the principle of equimarginality.
This is often expressed by saying that the economist assumes that people are rational.
Indeed, it has been said that a student becomes a true economist on the day when he fully
understands and accepts the principle that people equate costs and benefits at the
margin." (emphasis in original)); STEPHEN A. MATHIS & JANET KOscIANsKI, MICRO-
ECONOMIC THEORY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 2 (2002) ("[Mlaking rational choices is
a matter of choosing the amount(s) of some decision, or independent, variable(s) such
that the extra benefit received from the last unit chosen is just equal to its extra cost. In
economics, the process of measuring and comparing the extra benefits and extra costs
associated with a rational decision is known as marginal analysis.").
119. Buchanan, supra note 47, at 6.
120. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 290-91 ("[Pjerfect competition
requires that consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of the
relevant economic and technological data .... Firms must know the prices of all inputs
and the characteristics of all relevant technologies. And in its purest sense, perfect
competition requires that all of these economic decision-making units have an accurate
knowledge of the past, the present, and the future." (emphasis in original)).
121. See ANTHONY E. BoARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 31 (3d ed. 2006) ("Choose the combination of [goods or inputs] that
maximizes net benefits." (emphasis omitted)).
122. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 79; see also Buchanan, supra note 47,
at 5 ("If a potential chooser is made aware of the principle in its full import, he will
weigh alternatives more carefully, he will think in marginal terms, he will make
evaluations of opportunity costs, and, finally, he will search more diligently for genuine
alternatives .... The 'law' of choice states only that the individual decision-maker will
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benefit of an act of consumption is equal to its marginal cost.123 Firms
choose output levels at which their marginal revenue equals marginal
cost.124 Economic rationality necessarily requires that all costs and
benefits be considered when exercising economic choices. To the extent
all such costs and benefits are not considered, that is, they are external to
the rational decision making process, non-utility or non-profit maximizing
choices will be made resulting in unacceptable market inefficiencies.
25
Part II below emphasizes and illustrates the importance of a social
system circumscribed by well-defined rights and its relevancy to econ-
omics' model premised on rational choice. When autonomous, utility-
maximizing choices drive the well-being of the individual, such choices
must be made with some knowledge that the choices will actually be
effectuated. They must be made with the confidence and security that the
individual will reap the consequences of his or her choices, whether good
or bad. An individual's knowledge of his or her rights, clearly defined and
prescribed by law, is a critical predicate to the act of accurately weighing
one's marginal benefits and costs with respect to a pending choice. 26 The
absence of such knowledge, or even the absence of clearly defined rights
secured by a uniformly enforced regimen of laws, renders the accuracy of
one's marginal analysis suspect. Error in one's marginal analysis ultima-
tely threatens, if not obstructs, perfect competition's condition of rational
action. Accordingly, the structural efficiencies of free enterprise are in-
deed threatened by uncertain, asymmetric regulatory environments, the
administration of which is often characterized as arbitrary, capricious, or
even whimsical.
select that alternative that stands highest on his preference ordering.").
123. See PINDYCK & RJBRNFELD, supra note 94, at 80 ("[S]atisfaction is maximized
when the marginal benefit-the benefit associated with the consumption of one
additional unit of food-is equal to the marginal cost-the cost of the additional unit of
food.").
124. Id. at 259.
125. MANSFIELD & YoHE, supra note 104, at 675 ("[P]roducers act in ways that cause
harm to others without paying the full cost of that damage. In these and other, similar
cases, the pursuit of private gain will not necessarily promote the social welfare.").
126. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
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E. Operational and Allocative Efficiency-The Perfectly Competitive
Model's Long-Run Equilibrium
127
"Operationally" is defined as follows:
Competitive conditions ultimately force each firm in each market to
produce at the least possible cost permitted by known techniques. Firms
that fail to do so may temporarily break even or perhaps make modest
profits when demand is high, but will incur losses and eventually
disappear as resources commanded by more efficient firms move into
the market. In long-run equilibrium, each firm will be producing at
minimum average total cost in plants of most efficient scale.128
"Allocatively" is defined as follows:
The key conditions creating optimal allocative efficiency are a
sufficiently large number of sellers and buyers in each market and
resource mobility. Where each individual seller's output decisions have
no perceptible effect on price, each will take price as given, and profit
maximization will impel each to produce that output at which the added
cost of the last unit (marginal cost) just equals price. If at that point the
sellers in some markets are earning higher profits (revenues in excess
of total cost) than sellers in other markets, resources will flow from the
low-return to the high-return markets until returns are equalized. In
equilibrium, price will equal marginal cost for all goods and services,
and rates of return (adjusted for risk) on investment in the various
markets will be equal and sufficient to maintain investment at current
levels. Since each price reflects the value of each product to the
marginal buyer, and since each price equals the cost of the marginal
unit of output, consumer welfare is maximized; any rearrangement of
inputs and outputs can only decrease the aggregate value of what
consumers receive.' 
29
1. Perfect Competition in the Short-Run and The Price-Taking Firm
Figure 2 below illustrates short-run producer surplus' 30 for a profit-
maximizing (rational), price-taking firm in a competitive market.' 3 ' As a
127. See PINDYCK & RUBtNFELD, supra note 94, at 272-77, for a detailed and robust
discussion of the long-run equilibrium in competition.
128. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOw, supra note 93, 402b1.
129. Id. T 402b2.
130. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 269 ("If marginal cost is rising, the
price of the product is greater than marginal cost for every unit produced except the last
one. As a result, firms earn a surplus on all but the last unit of output. The producer
surplus of a firm is the sum over all units produced of the differences between the market
price of the good and the marginal costs of production. Just as consumer surplus
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Figure 2 PERFECr COMPETITION IN THE SHORT-RUN &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM
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price-taker, 132 the market dictates an equilibrium quantity at a market-
clearing price (Pe). Acting independently 133 and rationally, 134 the firm will
seek to maximize profits at Qs, where its marginal revenue equals its
short-run marginal costs (SMC = Pc = Pe). 135 Because of the price-taking
condition, an individual firm in competition perceives a perfectly elastic,
horizontal demand curve (dirh). Since the forces of supply and demand set
a market-clearing price of Pe, a firm perceives an infinite demand-it can
and will sell all of its units of production at whatever price the market sets.
For each unit sold, the firm will be paid the market price of Pe = Pc; and
for each additional unit sold by the firm, the firm will receive additional
measures the area below an individual's demand curve and above the market price of the
product, producer surplus measures the area above a producer's supply curve and below
the market price.").
131. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 269-71.
132. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining that the price-taking
condition of perfect competition is a function of both the number of competitive firms in
the market and their respective market shares with respect to units produced, i.e., given
the number of firms and their respective productive capacities, no one firm can influence
price by the amount of inputs it consumes or units it produces).
133. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 106, 118 and accompanying text.
135. PINDYCK & RUBENFELD, supra note 94, at 269 ("The producer surplus is ... the
sum of... 'unit surpluses' over all units that the firm produces. It is given by the ... [area
under the firm's perceived horizontal demand curve] and above its marginal cost curve,
from zero output to the profit-maximizing output.").
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revenue equal to the market price of Pe = Pc. The market price (Pe) equals
the firm's marginal revenue (MR) associated with the firmn's additional
unit sales. 136 Consequently, the firm's short-run marginal revenue curve
corresponds to its perceived individual demand curve (dith).1
37
The firm's individual supply curve corresponds to its marginal cost
curve; 138 it reflects the various quantities of output the firm is willing to
supply with respect to a corresponding schedule of prices.' 39 The market
supply curve may roughly be approximated by "the horizontal summation
of the short-run supply curves of all the firms in the industry."' 140 In Figure
136. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 328-29 (defining "marginal
revenue" as "the change in revenue that results from a unit change in output"); see also
COLANDER, supra note 90, at 245 ("Since profit is the difference between total revenue
and total cost, what happens to profit in response to a change in output is determined by
marginal revenue (MR), the change in total revenue associated with a change in quantity
.. "); NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 112, at 251 ("It is the revenue
obtained from selling one more unit of output that is relevant to the profit-maximizing
firm's output decision. If the firm can sell all it wishes without having any effect on
market price, the market price will indeed be the extra revenue obtained from selling one
more unit. Phrased in another way, if a finrn's output decisions will not affect market
price, marginal revenue is equal to the price at which a unit sells.").
137. See MARK HiRscHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 384 (10th ed. 2003) ("[T]he
firm's demand curve is seen to be, for all practical purposes, a horizontal line. Thus, it is
clear that under perfect competition, the individual firm's output decisions do not affect
price in any meaningful way. Price can be assumed constant irrespective of the output
level at which the firm chooses to operate."); see also id. at 386 fig.10.3 (illustrating and
explaining that "[flirms face horizontal demand curves in perfectly competitive
markets").
138. Id. at 389 ("The perfectly competitive firm's short-run supply curve corresponds
to that portion of the marginal cost curve that lies above the average variable cost
curve."); see COLANDER, supra note 90, at 5; MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at
296 ('The short-run supply curve is, by construction, exactly the same as the firm's short-
run marginal-cost curve . (emphasis omitted)); see also supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
139. See also NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 112, at 257 ("The
firm's short-run supply curve shows how much it will produce at various possible prices.
For a profit-maximizing firm that takes the price of its output as given, this curve consists
of the positively sloped segment of the firm's short-run marginal cost above the point of
minimum average variable cost." (emphasis omitted)).
140. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 297; see also COLANDER, supra note 90,
at 254 ("In the short run when the number of firms in the market is fixed, the market
supply curve is just the horizontal sum of all the firms' marginal cost curves, taking
account of any changes in input prices that might occur." (emphasis in original));
HIRSCHEY, supra note 137, at 389 ("Market supply curves are the sum of supply for
individual firms at various prices.").
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2, the firm produces Qs units given a market price of Pe = Pc, reaping
short-run profits (ns) equal to the area of ABCD.
It is noted that "[a] firm need not always earn a profit in the short-
run. ' ' 142 In fact, as a price-taker, the firm may find itself confronted with a
market price that falls below its short-run average costs (Pe < SAC) and
thus be forced to operate at a loss or exit the industry. Under such
circumstances, a firm may nonetheless continue to operate at a short-run
loss because of its expectation of earning profits in the future "when the
price of its product increases or the cost of its production falls, and
because the shutting down and starting up again would be costly. ' 143 If the
market price, however, "is less than [short-run] average variable costs, the
firm should produce nothing and incur a loss equal to total fixed costs.
Losses will increase if any output is produced and sold when P <
[SAVCI."'144 Under such circumstances, the firm should shut down and
exit the industry.
Given the perfectly competitive model's condition of no entry or exit
barriers, 145 profits attract market entry. When a firm experiences losses,
such losses encourage market exit. Such entry and exit causes market
supply to expand or contract as reflected by a shift of the market supply
curve (S) to either the right or left, respectively. For example, Figure 3
below illustrates the impact on the firm's profits in competition as such
profits attract entry. For the purpose of simplicity, it is assumed that "there
are no sunk costs so that average economic cost is equal to average total
cost. ' ' 146 Attracted by the profits reflected in Figure 3 below, firms enter
the market causing the supply curve (S) to shift to S' causing the market
price to fall to Pc', which is below the firm's short-run average cost curve
(SAC). At a market price equal to Pc', the firm experiences losses equal to
the area of rectangle ABCD. And since it is assumed that there are no sunk
costs, the firm can easily exit the market and invest its capital in other
141. See supra Figure 2. Note the following: fl (profit) = Total Revenues (TR) - Total
Costs (TC); TR = PC * QS = area of ABFE; TC = PI (Average Cost of Inputs) * QS =
area of DCFE; H-S = area of ABCD = area of ABFE (total revenue) - area of DCFE (total
costs).
142. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 259.
143. Id.
144. HIRSCHEY, supra note 137, at 389 ("If price exceeds average variable cost, then
each unit of output provides at least some profit contribution to help cover fixed costs and
provide profit. The minimum point on the firm's average variable cost curve determines
the lower limit, or cutoff point, of its supply schedule.").
145. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
146. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 259.
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markets with higher returns. 147 Thus, "the firm should shut down when the
price of its product is less than the average total cost at the profit-
maximizing output.'
' 148
Figure 3 PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE SHORT RUN &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE ENTRY
Finr in Competition Market Supply and Demand








With the decline of the market price to Pc' and the resulting short-run
losses, the above hypothetical firm (as well as other firms similarly
situated) will rationally opt to exit the market. Market supply contracts as
reflected by a shift of the market supply curve from S' to S" as illustrated
in Figure 4 below.
149
Ultimately, a long-run competitive equilibrium is reached when all
firms in the market are maximizing profits at the new competitive
equilibrium price (Pc" = SAC = SMC). At Pc", the firm is earning zero
economic profits, which "means that the firm is earning a normal-i.e.,
competitive-return on that investment." 150 Stated differently, "a firm is
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis omitted).
149. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 255 ("[I]f the price is lower than the price necessary
to earn a profit, firms incurring losses will leave the market and the market supply curve
will shift to the left. As market supply shifts to the left, market price will rise. Firms will
continue to exit the market and market price will continue to rise until all remaining firms
no longer incur losses and earn zero profit. Only at zero profit do entry and exit stop.").
150. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 273 (emphasis in original); see also
COLANDER, supra note 90, at 257 ("Zero profit does not mean that entrepreneurs don't
2010] FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE RULE OF LAW 275
Figure 4 LONG-RUN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFrER COMPETITIVE EXIT







earning a normal return on its investment-i.e., it is doing as well as it
could by investing its money elsewhere."'151 As one economist explains,
"If the owner manages the firm, zero economic profits also include what
he or she would earn in the best alternative occupation (i.e., managing the
firm for someone else). Thus, zero economic profits mean that the total
revenues of the firm just cover all costs (explicit and implicit)."'
' 5 2
2. Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium and the Condition of Zero
Economic Profits
In Figure 4 above, there is little incentive for the firm to exit the
market; similarly, there is little incentive for other firms to enter the
market. 53 In summary:
get anything for their efforts. The entrepreneur is an input to production just like any
other factor of production. In order to stay in the business the entrepreneur must receive
the opportunity cost, or normal profit (the amount the owners of business would have
received in the next-best alternative). That normal profit is built into the costs of the firm;
economic profits are profits above normal profits." (emphasis in original)); DOMINICK
SALVATORE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 332 (5th ed. 2004)
("When a perfectly competitive market is in long-run equilibrium, firms break even and
earn zero economic profits. Therefore, the owner of the firm receives only a normal
return on investment or an amount equal to what he or she would earn by investing his or
her funds in the best alternative venture of similar risk.").
151. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 273.
152. SALVATORE, supra note 150, at 332.
153. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 274.
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[F]irms in long-run equilibrium must produce at the minimum of their
long-run average-cost curves. How so? Firms set price equal to long-
run marginal cost to maximize their economic profits. But long-run
equilibrium in the market can be sustained only if price equals long-run
average cost so that economic profits are equal to [zero] and returns to
employed resources are normal. And both of these conditions are
satisfied only where long-run marginal cost equals long-run average
cost at the minimum of the long-run average cost curve. 154
The zero economic profit condition of the perfectly competitive
model's long-run equilibrium "is enormously powerful;"' 155 it ultimately
explains and demonstrates the importance of the model's underlying
conditions-numerous price-taking buyers and sellers, each acting inde-
pendently and rationally; subject to little, if any, entry and exit barriers; all
acting upon complete and accurate market information involving the
demand and supply for a homogeneous good, with little or no govern-
mental intervention and interference or obstruction of the equilibrating
forces of supply and demand; with all other potential influences remaining
constant or equal (ceteris paribus). When these conditions hold, the per-
fectly competitive market guides and directs scarce resources to their
highest and most valued uses, and thereby minimizes, if not eliminates,
waste.
If economic profits are being earned in any given competitive market,
rational firms will exit their existing market where they are earning only
normal profits and redirect their resources to the more profitable market.
Provided there are no barriers to exit and entry, and provided that all
competing firms have access to complete and accurate market information,
competitive entry will chisel away at the otherwise available profits until a
long-run equilibrium of zero economic but normal profits is reached.
Upon attaining such a long-run equilibrium, rational firms are faced with
the following choice: (1) be satisfied with earning normal profits; (2)
pursue costs-saving innovations necessary for the firm to again earn above
normal, economic profits (further attracting additional competitive entry);
154. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 307 (emphasis omitted).
155. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 255.
It makes the analysis of competitive markets far more applicable to the
real world than can a strict application of the assumption of perfect
competition. If economic profit is being made, firms will enter and
compete that profit away. Price will be pushed down to the average
total cost of production as long as there are no barriers to entry.
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or (3) exit the market in search of above normal, economic profits
elsewhere.
Option 1 (being satisfied with earning normal profits) is dangerous,
especially if other competitors continue to seek costs-saving innovations.
Complacency in the market may lead to market exit. Option 2 (pursuing
costs-saving innovations necessary to again earn above normal economic
profits) is rational from both short- and long-run perspectives. In the short-
run, success in the discovery and implementation of costs-saving innova-
tions will likely lead to short-run economic profits. In the long-run, such
innovations will continue to drive input costs down, making more goods
available at decreasing market prices. Option 3 (exiting the market and
search for above normal, economic profits), might have a temporary, but
slight, short-run effect on the market from which the firm is exiting, but it
will have a countervailing short-run effect on the market the resources
ultimately enter, with both markets subject to a renewed long-run equili-
brium of normal profits.1
56
Figure 5 PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE LONG RuN &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFrER COMPETITIVE EXIT
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Figure 5 above illustrates the continued competitive pressure on a
firm's cost structure. As firms exit the market to minimize or eliminate
their short-run losses and seek normal or above normal profits elsewhere,
156. See HiRscHEY, supra note 137, at 404, for a more detailed discussion on
competitive strategy in perfectly competitive markets. "Competitive strategy is the search
for a favorable competitive position and durable above-normal profits in an industry or
line of business." Id.
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the market supply curve S' contracts and shifts to the left to S-,157
resulting in a new competitive price of Pc". At Pc", the firm earns normal
profits. The desire to earn economic profits (above normal profits) places a
long-run downward pressure on a competitive firm's costs of production;
it must innovatively reduce its overall cost structure to continue to earn
economic profits. Successful innovation drives a competitive firm's cost
structure down. With its cost curves shifting downward, it will again reap
short-run, above normal, economic profits. Such profits will again attract
market entry, and, provided all of the underlying conditions of competition
continue to hold, a new long-run equilibrium will once again be reached
reflecting lower market prices and zero economic profits.
It is within this context that such a condition is "enormously
powerful."'158 The perfectly competitive model's condition of zero long-
run economic profits nurtures its creative, innovative and progressive
nature.
Competition may ... impel firms to be efficient in seeking new or
improved products and new cost-saving production techniques. With
markets in equilibrium and prices just covering costs, such innovations
would be the only way by which higher profits could be achieved ....
Whenever innovating effort takes resources and hence involves costs,
the effort will not be made absent the prospect of an appropriate
reward. To the extent that innovations become quickly known and
quickly copied by others without cost to them, competitive pricing will
prevent the innovator from recovering its innovation costs. Thus, it is
probable that appropriate allocation of resources to innovative efforts
requires at least lags in competitive response and perhaps even further
guarantees or prospects of reward .... [A]ntitrust policy must be
appropriately concerned not only with rules that hinder innovation
unnecessarily, but also with rules that are too lenient toward restraints
or other limitations on innovation.'
5 9
It is within this context that Adam Smith praised laissez-faire political
economies.160 Note that Smith's observation was dependent on a qualified,
157. Id. at 74. "In functional form," a supply function can be expressed as Qx -
supplied = f(Px, Prelated goods, # suppliers, Pinputs, Technology, Expectations, Xi...
Xn). See id. As previously stated, the market supply curve is derived from the horizontal
summation of all the individual firm marginal cost curves. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. Consequently, as firms leave the market, the market supply curve
will shift to the left, especially since it is a function of the number of suppliers in the
market.
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
159. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SoLow, supra note 93, 402b3.
160. 1 SMrrH, supra note 42, at bk. 1, ch. i, p. 22 ("It is the great multiplication of the
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institutional framework capable of cultivating "a well-governed soc-
iety."' 161 Thus, the institutional, governing framework of any laissez-faire-
based society must adopt and administer laws that nurture, promote, and
advance the fundamental tenets of the perfectly competitive economic
model and all its underlying conditions.
1 62
III. LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW-AN INTIMATE
AND RECIPROCATING RELATIONSHIP
A. The Administration of Justice-An Essential Duty of the Sovereign
Even the anarchist must acknowledge that "anarchy remains tolerable
only to the extent that it does produce an acceptable degree of order."
163
productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which
occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the
lowest ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to
dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman being
exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods
for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of
theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they accom-
modate him as amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself
through all the different ranks of the society.").
161. Id.
162. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 145 ("The pursuit of the public interest must
consist not only in desisting from regulation, but also in establishing (and maintaining) an
environment of free competition."); see also F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Collect-
ivism, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F. A. HAYEK: THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 83, 87
(Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007) ("The functioning of a competition not only requires adequate
organization of certain institutions like money, markets, and channels of information-
some of which can never be adequately provided by private enterprise-but it depends,
above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to
preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible. It is by no means
sufficient that the law should recognize the principle of private property and freedom of
contract; much depends on the precise definition of the right of property as applied to
different things. The systematic study of the forms of legal institutions which will make
the competitive system work efficiently has been sadly neglected; and strong arguments
can be advanced that serious shortcomings here, particularly with regard to the law of
corporations and of patents, not only have made competition work much less effectively
than it might have done but have even led to the destruction of competition in many
spheres.").
163. James M. Buchanan, Commencement, in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M.
BUCHANAN: THE LIMrrs OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 3, 8 (Liberty
Fund, Inc. 2000) (1975).
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Ironically, unlimited freedom ultimately leads to a dismal state of despotic
constraint where the weak are ruled by the strong. The absence of any
degree of order nurtures an involuntary state of nature where the fittest
survive and the powerful reign; where the will of the weak is involuntarily
subordinated to the will of the powerful; where status and privilege are
determined from coincidences of nature. Liberty, however, necessarily
depends on the existence of a social order capable of imposing constraint.
After all, one can only be free from others if the latter are constrained
from interfering with the former.164 It is in this sense that freedom and
constraint are inextricably linked-that liberty and law are inevitably
intertwined. 165
It likewise follows that free enterprise requires a geopolitical regime of
order capable of imposing constraint. Free enterprise implies "a situation
in which those engaged in market transactions have some power to
constrain the enemies of a free market." 166 We are instructed that "[t]he
classical argument for freedom in economic affairs rests on the tacit
postulate that the rule of law should govern policy in this as in all other
spheres. ' 67 While the efficiencies of free enterprise discussed above
require free and autonomous human action, such efficiencies cannot be
realized within a social system devoid of order. Rather, the efficiencies of
free enterprise are the product of a social system of order circumscribed by
well-defined rights and inextricably secured by the rule of law.
168
Although often viewed as the antithesis of a libertarian society, the rule of
law is paradoxically one of its essential ingredients.
Although neo-classical economists discharged the sovereign from "the
duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it
towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society,"
169
164. BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 48-49 (1972).
165. Id. at 49.
166. Id.
167. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 220 ("Freedom of economic activity had meant freedom
under the law, not the absence of all government action.").
168. James M. Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Trans-
action Cost, in ANSPRUCHE, EIGENTUM UND VERFUGUNGSRECHTE 9 (Duncker & Hum-
blot 1984), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, supra note
2, at 260, 261 ("Lawyers, as well as economists, have come to recognize, however, that
well-defined rights can facilitate exchanges.").
169. 2 SMITH, supra note 84, at bk. IV, ch. ix, p. 687; see also Adam Smith, Report
Dated 1766, in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 395 (R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael & P. G.
Stein eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1982) (1778). Throughout his lectures on jurisprudence,
Smith recognized the causality between lawlessness and inefficiency. For example, when
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they refused to overstate the case for liberty by acknowledging the need
for a centralized government empowered to constrain individual con-
duct.170 In fact, Smith maintained:
The first and chief design of all civil[] governments, is, as I observed,
to preserve justice amongst the members of the state and prevent all
[e]ncroachments on the individual[]s in it, from others of the same
society.-{That is, to maintain each individual in his perfect rights. }
Justice is vio[1]ated whenever one is deprived of what he had a right to
and could justly demand from others, or rather, when we do him any
injury or hurt without a cause.171
Indeed, Smith advocated that a well-governed, laissez-faire society
could only prosper within a governmental regime that was conferred with
explicit and essential limited powers and duties. Smith, however, emph-
asized that one such essential but limited sovereign duty was the power to
protect and secure every member from the injustice and oppression of
every other member. In this regard, Smith infamously explained:
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three
duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain
and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent
societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other
member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of
justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain pub-
lick [sic] works and certain publick [sic] institutions, which it can never
be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to
erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence
[sic] to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may
frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.
172
giving an account of the origin of modem Europe upon the fall of the Roman Empire,
Smith observed "[als these nations were almost lawless, and under no authority, depred-
ations were continually committed up and down the country and all kinds of commerce
stopped." Id. at 416. While discussing Europe's slow progress with respect to commerce
after the fall of the Roman Empire, Smith observed that "[alnother thing which greatly
retarded commerce was the imperfection of the law with regard to contracts ... for
original[l]y the law gave no redress for any but those concluded on the spot." Id. at 528.
170. ALT & CHRYSTAL, supra note 57, at 15-16.
171. Adam Smith, Report of 1762-3, in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
169, at 7; see also 2 SMrrH, supra note 84, at bk. V, ch. i, pt. H, p. 708-09 ("The second
duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society
from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing
an exact administration of justice .... ").
172. 2 SMrrH, supra note 84, at bk. IV, ch. ix, pp. 687-88.
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It is in this context that neo-classical libertarians have long "acknow-
ledge[d] the necessity of some enforcing agent, some institutionalized
means of resolving interpersonal disputes." Similarly, it is in this con-
text that productive liberty (i.e. productive in the sense of pursuing and
achieving wealth-creation) requires a modicum of order, within which free
exchange is secured by both the rule of law and a sovereign power with
limited but essential duties. "That there is some kind of order, consistency
and constancy, in social life is obvious. If there were not, none of us
would be able to go about his [or her] affairs or satisfy his [or her] most
elementary wants."'
174
B. Securing the Blessings of Liberty-A Prerequisite for a Wealth-
Producing, Well-Governed Society
As outlined by Smith and reiterated by our founding fathers in the
Preamble of the Constitution, the sovereign's duties include the provision
of a "common defence"'175 and the promotion of "the general [w]elfare"'
176
(through the supply of public goods). 177 Although these duties are vital to
the formation of "a more perfect Union"'178 (i.e., the formation of a well-
governed society), the focus of this Article relates to the sovereign's duty
to "establish U]ustice"' 7 9 for the purposes of insuring "domestic [tjran-
quility"18 and securing "the [b]lessings of liberty."81 While the term
"justice" is often colored by ambiguity and subjectivity, Smith used the
173. Buchanan, supra note 163, at 9.
174. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 160.
175. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
176. See id.
177. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 37 ("Another role for government is to supply
public goods. A public good is a good that if supplied to one person must be supplied to
all and whose consumption by one individual does not prevent its consumption by
another individual .... An example of a public good is national defense. In order to sup-
ply defense, governments must force people to pay for it with taxes, rather than leaving it
to the market to supply it." (emphasis in original)).
178. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. It merits noting the remarkable parallels between Smith's statement out-
lining the essential but limited duties of the sovereign and the Preamble's statement
outlining the essential and limited purposes of the Constitution. Moreover, given the
influence of the neo-classical movement during the latter part of the 18th century, there
can be no doubt that one of the blessings of liberty is its capacity to facilitate the creation
of the universal "opulence" envisioned by Smith.
FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE RULE OF LAW
term to specifically reference a process or means by which "to prevent the
members of a society from incroaching [sic] on one anothers [sic]
property, or siezing [sic] what is not their own." 182 The assignment of a
property right circumscribes an individual, experiential sphere of activity
within which individual and autonomous expressions of liberty are pro-
tected by the simultaneous limitation of liberty rights of others with
respect to the circumscribed sphere.' 83 To state it more simply, "[w]ithout
some definition of boundaries or limits on the set of rights to do things
and/or to exclude or prevent others from doing things, an individual, as
such, could hardly be said to exist.
''84
It is in this context that property rights are not only necessary pre-
requisites for the creation of "opulence," but are also sources of legitimate
sovereign power, especially given that it is the sovereign's duty to
establish justice and the grounding of justice upon the protection of
property rights. With the social recognition of the right to hold, own, and
direct property, it is "absolutely necessary that the hand of government
should be continually held up and the community assert their power to
preserve the property of the individual.' 85 Governmental preservation of
well-defined, individual property and liberty rights is therefore a necessary
condition for allocative efficiency: scarce resources will be directed to
their most highly valued uses thereby minimizing waste externalities.' 
86
The neo-classical model of justice is grounded upon a reverence for
the rule of law and an acknowledgement of a sovereign power purposively
designed to secure one's property and liberty rights-both of which are
essential ingredients of a well-governed society. Security nurtures an envi-
ronment within which individuals are empowered to define themselves by
contract rather than by status, and permits the circumvention of artificially
imposed barriers prescribed by an arbitrary social order of stature. It is
182. Smith, Report of 1762-3, supra note 171, at 5.
183. See HAYEK, supra note 1, at 148 ("The rule whereby the indivisible border line is
fixed within which the being and activity of each individual obtain a secure and free
sphere is the law." (quoting F. C. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN
RECHTS 331-32 (Berlin 1840))).
184. Buchanan, supra note 163, at 14-15.
185. Smith, Report of 1762-3, supra note 171, at 208 ("[T]he age of shepherds is that
where government first commences. Property makes it absolutely necessary."); see also 2
SMITH, supra note 84, at bk. V, ch. i, pt. H, p. 710 ("The acquisition of valuable and
extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil government.
Where there is no property, ... civil government is not so necessary.").
186. See Buchanan, supra note 168, at 261 (noting that "voluntary exchange in well-
defined rights provides a sufficient condition for allocative efficiency").
2010] 283
284 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:235
within this environment of security that one can pursue his or her personal
and unique destiny, and, in the course of doing so, direct scarce resources
to their highest valued use. Social waste is minimized, and social opulence
is maximized. Such security is attained, however, when a governmental
regime is grounded upon the rule of law, which reigns equally over all
participants regardless of status or position. As Austrian economist and
Nobel Laureate, Friedrich A. Hayek explained:
"The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from Status to Contract." The conception of status, of an assigned place
that each individual occupies in society, corresponds, indeed, to a state
in which the rules are not fully general but single out particular persons
or groups and confer upon them special rights and duties. The emphasis
on contract as the opposite of status is, however, a little misleading, as
it singles out one, albeit the most important, of the instruments that the
law supplies to the individual to shape his own position. The true
contrast to a reign of status is the reign of general and equal laws, of the
rules which are the same for all, or, we might say of the rule of leges in
the original meaning of the Latin word for laws-leges that is, as
opposed to the privileges. 187
To summarily reiterate, neo-classical Political Economy teaches that
"the rule of law, stability of private property and the withdrawal of pol-
itical interference with private choices could unleash the entrepreneurial
energies that are latent within each of us." 188 The importance of the rule of
law with respect to the cultivation of national wealth cannot be overstated,
especially to the extent such law secures the rights of liberty and property.
While unfettered freedom is a critical ingredient of well-governed, wealth-
producing-society, the "exact administration" 189 of the rule of law is
equally critical: 190
187. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 154 (quoting HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 151
(London 1861)) (emphasis added to that in original).
188. Buchanan, supra note 83, at 187.
189. 2 SMITH, supra note 84, at bk. V, ch. i, pt. II, pp. 708-09. Smith's use of the term
"exact administration of justice" when describing one of the essential duties of the sover-
eign raises the definitional issue of the term's parameters: what constitutes an "exact
administration of justice"? See id.
190. E.g., 1 SMITH, supra note 42, at bk. I1, ch. iv, p. 412 (observing that "commerce
and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the
liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before
lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency
upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most
important of all [the] effects [on the cultivation of national opulence].").
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Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the
people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property
[and] in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law ....
Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state
in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of
government.191
C. Equal Protection under the Law-The Requirement of Uniform
Enforcement
Nonetheless, the neo-classical movement warned against the rule of
law's arbitrary, capricious execution and jurisprudence, condemning such
sovereign action as vexatious and oppressive, and often leaving room for
"individual despotism."' 192 Of equal concern was, and is, the persistence of
"imperfectly enforced" or "unenforced" laws. 193 Yet, the consequences of
the rule of law were, and are, "reasonably acceptable when the individuals
who obey them, or enact them, are reasonably impartial."'194 Its oppress-
iveness is minimized when the rule of law is universally, uniformly, and
equally applied to all market participants. 195 An individual's knowledge of
the law, its applicability, and its corresponding effects on all market
participants cultivates a socio-economic system regulated by clear and
well-defined rights. 1
96
Knowledge of well-defined rights, clearly prescribed by the rule of
law, enables the individual to foresee the consequences of his or her
actions within his or her artificial sphere of freedom fixed by such rights
and to act accordingly. 197 An individual can act with the confidence and
191. 2 SMITH, supra note 84, at bk. V, ch. iii, p. 910.
192. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 111 ("The fluctuating jurisprudence of unenforced
laws is thus especially propitious, in Smith's account, for the sort of highly personal opp-
resssion which he describes as vexation."); see also id. at 112 ("A 'jurisprudence which
was arbitrary, changing with public opinion,' ... was both unjust and an insecure foun-
dation for commerce." (quoting Anne-Robert-Jaques Turgot)); id. (A setting in which
",one could let the law sleep, while reserving the possibility of awakening it at the will of
prejudice, of public rumour, and of the whim of every judge'... [is] not a setting in which
commerce could flourish, or in which individual merchants could feel themselves
secure." (quoting Marquis de Condorcet)).
193. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 109.
194. Id. at 111.
195. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 153-54.
196. See supra Part HI.B.
197. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 148 ("The rule whereby the indivisible border line is
fixed within which the being and activity of each individual obtain a secure and free
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security that he or she will reap the consequences of his or her actions.
198
It is with such confident, secure, and autonomous individual action that
universal opulence may be effectuated, that the efficiencies of perfect
competition may be realized, and that a well-governed society may be
attained. It is in this context that the exact administration of justice (i.e. the
uniform and equal application of the rule of law) is imperative. Consider
the following statements written by Adam Smith:
Justice ... is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is
removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric
which to raise and support seems in this world, if I may say so, to have
been the peculiar and darling care of Nature, must in a moment crumble
into atoms.
199
As society cannot subsist unless the laws of justice are tolerably
observed, as no social intercourse can take place among men who do
not generally abstain from injuring one another; the consideration of
this necessity, it has been thought, was the ground upon which we
approved of the enforcement of the laws of justice by punishment of
those who violated them. 2 °
It is from this perspective that free enterprise (i.e., the invisible hand)
"requires both good institutions and good norms, whereby individuals
pursue their interests within the rules of well-defined games, and not by
seeking to influence institutions and rules."
201
IV. CETERIS PARIBUS AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Power of Models-Robustness in Simplification
Part III of this Article restated the case for free enterprise, noting the
delicate and intimate relationship between liberty, the state, and wealth-
creation. Economics' model of perfect competition is a formalized abstr-
action of this relationship. As an abstraction, the model of perfect compe-
tition is often dismissed by its critics for its overly simplistic assumptions
sphere is the law." (quoting F. C. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN
RECHTS (Berlin 1840)); see also id. at 153.
198. Id. at 153-54.
199. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 101 (Knud Haakonssen ed.,
2002).
200. Id. at 103.
201. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 43, at 127.
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and conditions. 202 Yet, these "classical conditions of 'free competition"'
are "the starting point of much of what is best in economic theory. 2 °3
Nonetheless, prudence dictates that one acknowledge the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of performing a dynamic analysis of the aggregate, espe-
cially since "everything depends on everything else" and "everything is
always changing."204 Abstraction, however, if properly understood and
utilized, is a robust analytical tool by which the social scientist can
identify and derive a sense of relationship and causality between variables
of any properly formulated abstraction or model. Such is the case with
economics' model of perfect competition.
B. The Condition of Ceteris Paribus/Absentus
The laws of the social sciences, 20 5 including economics, are general-
ized statements of "social" or "economic tendencies;" 206 they are state-
202. These assumptions include: (1) numerous buyers and sellers each acting inde-
pendently and rationally; (2) buyers and sellers are price-takers; (3) no barriers to entry;
(4) all market participants are informed of all relevant economic and technological data;
(5) all products are interchangeable substitutes for each other; (6) unfettered forces of
supply and demand (will result in market clearing quantities and prices); and (7)
assuming all other influences relevant to the model's performance are equal. See Part I.C
discussing the operational conditions of microeconomics' model of perfect competition.
203. VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 104, at 13.
204. James M. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes On Methodology, 24 S. ECON.
J. 259 (1958), reprinted in 12 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, supra
note 47, at 52 (emphasis added); see also VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note
104, at 8-15; Buchanan, What Should Economists Do?, supra note 2, at 37 ("A general
solution, if there is one, emerges as a result of a whole network of evolving exchanges,
bargains, trades, side payments, agreements, contracts which, finally at some point,
ceases to renew itself. At each stage in this evolution towards solution, there are gains to
be made, there are exchanges possible, and this being true, the direction of movement is
modified." (emphasis in original)).
205. See Paul Teller, The Law-Idealization, 71 PHIL. ScI. 730, 731 (2004)
("Traditionally, the word 'laws' has been reserved for universally applicable, excep-
tionless generalizations. Laws, in this sense, are contrasted with ceteris paribus gen-
eralizations (cp-generalizations), held not themselves to be genuine laws."); cf. Harold
Kincaid, Defending Laws in the Social Sciences, 20 PHIL. Soc. SCI. 56, 57 (1990)
Thus my main concern in this article is to defend laws-both their
possibility and their reality-in the social sciences. No doubt social
explanation is not exhausted by subsumption under laws-just as exp-
lanation in general involves both more and less than laws. Nonetheless,
laws do play an important role in explanation. Singular causal exp-
lanations, functional explanations, explanations via classification and
grouping (explaining "what"), and explanations in terms of underlying
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ments that "a certain course of action may be expected under certain
conditions. 2 °7 Some scholars have explained that the laws of economics,
as with every other science, "study the effects which will be produced by
certain causes, not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things
are equal, and that the causes are able to work out their effects
undisturbed. 2 °8 Such laws are generally "implicitly qualified with ceteris
mechanisms may well presuppose or implicitly invoke laws. And even
if one denies-contra what seem to me powerful arguments-that laws
are involved in or entailed by such explanations, there can be little
doubt that laws can greatly strengthen these explanations. Showing that
an alleged particular cause instantiates a law, that some mechanism
always underlies some macroprocess, that some set of classifications
are related in a lawlike fashion, and so on, gives those explanations a
depth they would not have otherwise. Furthermore, no explanation is
completely compelling unless the explanatory statements are well-
confirmed; confirmation generally comes from repeatable manipulation
of data under controlled conditions, and laws both result from and help
make possible that process. Laws, explanation, and confirmation go
hand in hand. Thus if one is inclined to believe, as I am, that some parts
of the social sciences explain, then it is natural and perhaps necessary
to defend social laws.
Id.
206. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 33 (8th ed. 1920); see also
EKKEHART SCHLICHT, ISOLATION AND AGGREGATION IN ECONOMICS 1 (1985)
("[E]conomics is not concerned with the idiosyncrasies of particular cases, but looks for
general rules linking typical incidents. Usually these rules cannot be distilled stringently
from the multitude of individual actions, and economics is bound, hence, to start from
assumptions on behaviour of aggregates-or 'representative' agents-which are liked to
individual actions just vaguely.").
207. MARSHALL, supra note 206, at 33; see also Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey, When
Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity, 46 BRIT. J. PHIL.
Sci. 81, 83-84 (1995) ("Laws say that, whenever some initial condition obtains, some
other condition obtains as well .... But so stated, the law is doomed to have counter-
instances .... Thus, ... 'a ceteris paribus clause needs to be added here."' (emphasis in
original)).
208. MARSHALL, supra note 206, at 36 (emphasis in original); see also SCHLICHT,
supra note 206, at 3 ("Economic data are not ultimate data, like the speed of light in
physics. Rather they are provisional in nature. This is expressed by means of the ceteris
paribus clause. All factors not explicitly considered as variables are assumed to be fixed
within an argument. This clause is used, explicitly or implicitly, throughout econ-
omics."); Robert D. Rupert, Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of
Special-Science Properties, 42 NOuS 349, 349 (2008) ("Laws of such sciences as
psychology and economics hold only ceteris paribus-that is, when other things are
equal."). See generally Sven Ove Hansson, What is Ceteris Paribus Preference?, 25 J.
PHIL. LOGIC 307 (1996) (discussing ceteris paribus preferences).
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paribus (or, more accurately, ceteris absentus) clauses [and] ... describe
relations between variables that would hold if no other factors
intervened. 2 °9
Almost every scientific doctrine, when carefully and formally stated,
will be found to contain some proviso to the effect that other things are
equal: the action of the causes in question is supposed to be isolated;
certain effects are attributed to them, but only on the hypothesis that no
cause is permitted to enter except those distinctly allowed for.
21 0
The ceteris paribus condition or clause, while one of the most
important operational conditions of the perfectly competitive model, is
probably the one condition that is rarely addressed, likely taken for
granted, and often ignored. Ceteris paribus is a qualifying clause of a
generalized law asserting an axiomatic truth assuming "other things being
equal.",2I Although its use as a qualifying economic assumption dates as
209. Kincaid, supra note 205, at 70.
210. MARSHALL, supra note 206, at 36 (emphasis in original); see also SCHLICHT,
supra note 206, at 1 ("Economic phenomena are the outcomes of a plethora of factors,
and economic analysis, unable to tackle them all, is compelled to select those factors
which seem to be the most important, and to consider all other influences as data of the
analysis. But these data are only provisional since they are wandering themselves. One
characteristic of economic analysis is, then, that it is built on a moving foundation."
(emphasis added)).
211. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER'S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 219 (2003) (defining ceteris paribus as "[o]ther things being
equal"). For a general discussion of ceteris paribus clauses, see Nancy Cartwright, In
Favor of Laws that Are Not Ceteris Paribus After All, 57 ERKENNTNIS 425 (2002),
reprinted in CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS 149 (John Earman, Clark Glymour & Sandra
Mitchell eds., 2002); John Earman, Clark Glymour & Sandra Mitchell, Editorial, 57
ERKENNTNIS 277 (2002), reprinted in CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS, supra, at 1; John Earman,
John Roberts & Sheldon Smith, Ceteris Paribus Lost, 57 ERKENNTNIS 281 (2002),
reprinted in CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS, supra, at 5; Mehmet Elgin & Elliott Sober,
Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization, 57 ERKENNTNIS 441 (2002), reprinted in
CETERIS PARIBuS LAWS, supra, at 165; Clark Glymour, A Semantics and Methodology for
Ceteris Paribus Hypothesis, 57 ERKENNTNIS 395 (2002), reprinted in CETERIS PARIBUS
LAWS, supra, at 119; Marc Lange, Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I
learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them, 57 ERKENNTNIS 407 (2002), reprinted in
CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS, supra, at 131; Sandra D. Mitchell, Ceteris Paribus-An
Inadequate Representation for Biological Contingency, 57 ERKENNTNIS 329 (2002),
reprinted in CETERIS PARMUS LAWS, supra, at 53; Gerhard Schurz, Ceteris Paribus
Laws: Classification and Deconstruction, 57 ERKENNTNIS 351 (2002), reprinted in
CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS, supra, at 75; Wolfgang Spohn, Laws, Ceteris Paribus
Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief, 57 ERKENNTNIS 373 (2002), reprinted in CETERIS
PARIBUS LAWS, supra, at 97; Jim Woodward, There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris
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far back as 1662,212 John Cairnes "is [often] credited with enunciating the
idea that the conclusions of economic investigations hold 'only in the
absence of disturbing causes. ' ' '2 13 In his Principles of Economics, pub-
lished in 1890, Alfred Marshall further popularized ceteris paribus,
214
causing some to refer to ceteris paribus as a "Marshallian device."
215
Although ceteris paribus assumptions or clauses are critical to the
application and operation of generalized conventional economic cons-
tructs, analysts and academics alike often cavalierly mention them for the
mere purpose of textural completeness. Whether classified "compar-
ative"'216 or "exclusive," 217 ceteris paribus assumptions nonetheless have a
robust significance with respect to the application of generalized economic
laws and theories. One scholar explains:
Ceteris paribus laws generally describe forces, relations, and so on as
they would operate in isolation. When things are not ceteris paribus,
the laws in question still apply. But they now describe tendencies-
partial elements of a complex situation. Tendency statements describe
an element-call it a force, process, or whatever-which would
produce a certain result in the presence of some larger set of conditions.
When those conditions are not met, the element in question is only a
Paribus Law, 57 ERKENNTNiS 303 (2002), reprinted in CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS, supra, at
27.
212. Earman, Glymour & Mitchell, supra note 211, at 1 (citing J. Persky, Ceteris
Paribus, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1990)).
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890)); see also
MARSHALL, supra note 206, at 29-37.
215. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 52.
216. See Schurz, supra note 211, at 75-76 ("The comparative sense of CP-clauses
derives from the literal meaning of 'ceteris paribus' as 'the others being equal.' A
comparative CP-law makes an assertion about functional properties, henceforth called
parameters. It claims that the increase (or decrease) of one parameter, say f(x), leads to an
increase (or decrease) of another parameter, say g(x), provided that all other (unknown)
parameters describing the states of the underlying system(s) remain the same. Thus, a
comparative CP-clause does not exclude the presence of other 'disturbing' factors, but
merely requires that they are kept constant." (emphasis in original)).
217. See id. at 76 ("In the philosophical debate, however, CP-laws have usually been
understood in the different exclusive sense. An exclusive CP-law asserts that a certain
state or event-type expressed by a (possibly complex) predicate Ax leads to another state
or event-type Cx provided disturbing influences are absent. Ax is called the antecedent
and Cx the consequent predicate. Thus an exclusive CP-clause does not merely require
keeping all other causally interfering factors constant; it rather excludes the presence of
causally interfering factors. In agreement with this exclusive understanding, [it has been]
remarked that 'the literal translation is "other things being equal;" but it would be more
apt to read "ceteris paribus" as "other things being right .... (emphasis in original)).
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tendency. Thus ceteris paribus laws and tendencies go hand in hand-
and that seems reasonable enough. The law of gravitation is implicitly
qualified with a ceteris paribus clause. While the law itself holds only
counter-factually, it nonetheless says something about reality. Attrac-
tion in proportion to squared distance is a tendency for any two bodies.
Citing the law explains because it identifies the tendency--even if the
conditions cited by the law in fact never strictly obtain.
218
Consequently, one "can see how laws about what does not obtain can
nonetheless explain what does obtain-they cite factors, aspects, and ten-
dencies of a complex situation. '2 19
C. Operationalizing the Ideal
When we speak of models, we speak of abstractions or simplifications
of an otherwise very complex reality. 22 Economic models are nothing
more than "[s]imple theoretical descriptions that capture the essentials of
how the economy works.' '221 However, the purpose of such simplifying
abstractions is to make our inquiry "scientifically manageable. ' '222 The
218. Kincaid, supra note 205, at 71-72.
219. Id. at 72.
220. Teller, supra note 205, at 732 ("Models are often, to lesser or greater degrees,
open ended with respect to what explicit verbally formulated consequences can be
derived from them."); see also Hansson, supra note 208, at 308 ("In practice we do not-
and cannot--deliberate on complete possible worlds. Due to our cognitive limitations, we
restrict our deliberations to manageable simplified models, 'small worlds.' Therefore,
preferences refer to a limited number of alternatives that are specified only to a limited
extent. The structure of the set of alternatives depends not only on what the facts are and
what is known about them, but also on the subject's needs and concerns."); Pietroski &
Rey, supra note 207, at 89 ("[T]he emergence of any theoretically interesting science
requires considerable abstraction and idealization. The actual world is too complex to
study all at once, so one proceeds by ignoring some aspects of the world in order to
understand others. We idealize away from friction, electric charge, and nuclear forces, for
example, when we seek to understand the effect of gravity on the motion of bodies.
However, such abstraction guarantees a loss of descriptive adequacy in any general-
ization we lay down, since actual bodies are always affected by, e.g. friction, at least a
little.").
221. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, supra note 112, at 4.
222. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 52
("But real problems can rarely be studied in dynamic terms .... Real problems require the
construction of models, and the skill of the scientist is reflected in the predictive or ex-
planatory value of the model chosen. We simplify reality to construct these models.
see also NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, supra note 112, at 4 ("[AIll
economists build simple models of various activities that they wish to study. These
models may not be especially realistic, at least in terms of their ability to capture the
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generalized model of perfect competition explains that if all of the
operational conditions of the perfectly competitive model hold, then
microeconomic theory dictates that the model's efficiencies in consum-
ption, production, and allocation will ultimately result in favor of society,
assuming all other things remain equal (ceteris paribus) or the absence of
all other disturbing influences (ceteris absentus).223
"[I]f no other forces [are] present, ' 224 or if all other forces are neut-
ralized by the assumption that they are constant or equal, the perfectly
competitive economic model actualizes wealth-creation. If Ai represents a
matrix of antecedent properties essential for the occurrence of B, then Ai
- B has "clear content" and results in wealth-creation. 225 By inserting the
ceteris paribus clause into the model, the economist removes the dynamic
elements of the subject under analysis, lays the foundation for partial
equilibrium analysis, 6 and creates the "means through which the ...
details of how a hammer is sold; but, just as scientists use models of the atom or
architects use models of what they want to build, so too economists use simplified
models to describe the basic features of markets. Of course, these models are
'unrealistic.' But maps are unrealistic too-they do not show every house or parking lot.
Despite this lack of 'realism,' maps help you see the overall picture and get you where
you want to go. That is precisely what a good economic model should do."); SAMUELSON
& NoRDIAus, supra note 43, at 5 ("Economic life is an enormously complicated hive of
activity .... The ultimate purpose of economic science ... is to understand this complex
undertaking .... Economists use the scientific approach to understand economic life ....
Often, economics relies upon analyses and theories. Theoretical approaches allow
economists to make broad generalizations .... (emphasis in original)).
223. See Rupert, supra note 208, at 366 ("Ceteris paribus law-statements seem to say
that when certain conditions hold, A causes B.").
224. Id. at 367 (quoting NANcY CARTWRIGHT, HOW THE LAWS OF PHYSICS LE 45
(1983)).
225. Id. at 367; see also Teller, supra note 205, at 733 ("We use cp-generalizations as
practical guides, knowing that they will sometimes fail us. For a cp-generalization to
function reliably as a guide requires skill or procedural knowledge in its application.");
cf. Kincaid, supra note 205.
226. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 52;
see also MATHIS & KoScIANSKI, supra note 118, at 615 ("[plartial equilibrium analysis
[is] the isolated examination of equilibrium in individual markets, and for individual
consumers and firms comprising those markets. Yet, if we examine these markets from a
broader perspective, we can easily demonstrate that markets for goods and services, as
well as individual consumers and firms in an economy, do not operate in isolation.
Rather, they are highly interdependent since events that affect one market or economic
agent ultimately influence the economic performance of other markets or agents."
(emphasis in original)); SAMUELSON & NoRDHAuS, supra note 43, at 284 ("[P]artial-
equilibrium analysis ... examines the behavior of a single market, household, or firm,
taking the behavior of all other markets and the rest of the economy as given."); cf.
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complex[ities] of reality [are reduced] to proportions which are
scientifically manageable."
22 7
While ceteris paribus clauses are often criticized for invoking
"idealization, '' 28 they nonetheless serve to operationalize a defined, but
idealized system.229 The first, and perhaps most important contribution a
ceteris paribus clause makes to scientific analysis is its acknowledgement
and affirmation that an idealized model (e.g., Ai - B) is driven by
complex multi-causal relationships between the model's antecedent
properties (i.e., A,) and its axiomatic consequent (i.e., B). The formal,
idealized model Ai "- B is realized only upon the occurrence of Ai,
assuming Ai is properly and completely specified, 230 and that there is
minimal causal interdependence among the antecedent properties of Ai.
Ceteris paribus clauses allow the analyst to manage the interdependent
relationships and intervening forces relevant to a given model's per-
formance. As one such analyst noted: "Theoretical laws hold only ceteris
paribus-they describe the way things would be if certain simplified
conditions held. By describing the counterfactual situation, theoretical
laws isolate basic processes, forces, and so on. Counteracting and
Pietroski & Rey, supra note 207, at 95 ("A cp-law cannot, of course, wholly explain any
fact that entails that the cp-law has a C-abnormal instance. But the cp-law may partially
explain such a fact. Indeed, if (as we have been suggesting) actual phenomena are
typically complex, and cp-laws effectively ignore some of the relevant factors, one
should expect cp-laws to provide only partial explanations of actual phenomena."
(emphasis in original)).
227. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 53.
228. Rupert, supra note 208, at 367; see also Martin Kusch, Fodor v. Kripke:
Semantic Dispositionalism, Idealization and Ceteris Paribus Clauses, 65.2 ANALYSIS
156, 158 (2005) ("Scientists seem happy to conceptualise [sic] dispositions with ceteris
paribus clauses and idealizations. ); Teller, supra note 205, at 730 ("There are few,
perhaps no known, exact, true, general laws. Some of the work of generalizations is
carried by ceteris paribus generalization .... Laws in the traditional sense can then be
thought of as idealizations, which idealize away from the conditions of application of
regularity guides. If we keep clearly in mind the status of laws as such idealizations,
problems surrounding traditional topics-such as lawlikeness, corresponding counter-
factuals and modality-no longer look to be intractable."); cf. Kincaid, supra note 205, at
68 ("Ceteris paribus clauses are neither principled nor insurmountable practical obstacles
to social laws.").
229. See Pietroski & Rey, supra note 207, at 84 ("[1I]t often turns out that 'ideal'
circumstances are not merely rare, they are nomologically impossible: it may be
impossible for ... markets to operate free of outside forces .... Correlatively, we think the
need for cp-laws stems from the need to idealize in a complex world .... " (emphasis in
original)).
230. See Rupert, supra note 208, at 368.
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complicating factors are removed; the basic nature of the force in question
is revealed.",
231
Nonetheless, we are well advised to never forget the fundamental truth
of interdependence with respect to Ai - B. 232 The general laws of
microeconomics proffer that the highly touted efficiency consequent (B)
of the perfectly competitive economic model results from the causal
influences of certain identified operational conditions (i.e., numerous
buyers and sellers, price-takers, perfect information, no barriers to entry,
etc.), assuming that there are no other interdependent relationships within
Ai, and that there are no other unspecified conditions that may have an
influence on B. Such an assumption is the ceteris paribus assumption and
allows the economist to analyze the partial influences that each of the
antecedent properties of Ai might have on the model's output (B).
Figure 6 ECONOMICS' MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION
At "-) B, where B represents wealth creation, the consequent of A,; and Aj
represents the following matrix of antecedent properties:
Xi: The existence of numerous buyers and sellers each acting independently
and rationally.
Xz: Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such a negligible amount of
the total output that no one buyer or seller can influence price by the amount
they either consume or produce.
X3: There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect to consumer or producer
Ai = markets.
X4: All market participants, i.e. all buyers and sellers, are fully informed of all
relevant economic and technological data.
Xs: All products are homogeneous, or rather, constitute interchangeable
substitutes for each other.
X6: The forces of supply and demand are free to determine the quantity of
output in a relevant market as well as determine a market clearing competitive
price.
Xz: Ceteris ParibuslAbsentus. i.e. all other influences relevant to the perfect
B= E Wealth Creation
231. Kincaid, supra note 205, at 70 (emphasis in original).
232. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 52.
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Accordingly, abstraction involves the deliberate, delicate, and yet
skillful task of selecting a particular subset of relationships in an effort to
minimize the interdependency of the model's variables.233 Abstraction
allows the economist to analyze the model's simplified causal relation-
ships without the constraints of having to manage and account for the
simultaneous structural relationships presumably resulting from the
model's internal parametric interdependence. With the selection of a par-
ticular subset of relationships (assumed to dominate the model's causal
form Ai -" B), the economist "then proceeds to neglect the remainder [of
relationships], even though he may fully recognize that certain spill-over
effects are exerted on variables which he has neglected by the changes
which he imposes upon the variables for closer scrutiny.,
234
In other words, if the purposes of analysis are purely formal, all of the
variables except two can be placed literally in ceteris paribus, and the
relationship between these two variables traced. Presumably the econ-
omist's interests in analysis go beyond this and extend to the derivation
of economically meaningful relationships. If this constraint is placed
upon him, the structure of the system itself must dictate his choice
among variables to be closely examined and those to be treated
parametrically .... Few, if any, meaningful results may be achieved by
using ceteris paribus to eliminate the study of large numbers of
variables. If such variables are closely related they must be studied
simultaneously; there is no escape route open. On the other hand, if the
various subsectors of the economy exhibit substantial independence,
this step may reduce the working model to reasonable proportions ....
Partial equilibrium analysis is possible only when the total number of
relationships is quite large. Clearly if the total number of relationships
is small and any substantial interdependence is indicated, the effects of
any initial change must be traced throughout the whole system.235
The abstraction (i.e., the selection) of variables to be included in our
formalized model Ai "- B becomes a daunting and critical task given the
implications of imposing a ceteris paribus clause.236 First, the meaning-
233. Teller, supra note 205, at 733 ("For a cp-generalization to function reliably as a
guide requires skill or procedural knowledge in its application .... But our procedural
knowledge always defies complete and exact specification and incorporation into the
specific statement.").
234. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 53
(emphasis in original).
235. Id. at 53-54.
236. Id. at 61 ("If economically meaningful results are to be produced, great care must
be exercised in classifying variables, and the use of ceteris paribus as a tool of analysis
must be approached with great caution.").
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fulness of any partial equilibrium analysis is dependent upon the correct
specification of relevant explanatory variables or antecedent conditions
presumed to be driving the system under analysis.237 Second, to the extent
that any neglected variables are interdependently and substantially related
to the model's specified variables, the imposition of ceteris paribus likely
will render an analysis meaningless. Finally, to the extent that one att-
empts to apply the model and its predictive power to the totality of
individuals or a system at large, the use of ceteris paribus is extremely
suspect. James M. Buchanan observed:
[T]he predictive error involved in neglecting all offsetting or
compensating variations, which is equivalent to using ceteris paribus
literally, need not be large if we remain content to analyze the behavior
of one individual or some one group of individuals smaller than the
total group .... [H]owever, erroneous results will be forthcoming from
this procedure when the attempt is made to reach conclusions supp-
osedly applicable for the totality of individuals, that is, for the whole
economy, and not for a specific subsector. The dangers in the misuse of
ceteris paribus are quite real for all cases where an attempt is made to
extend conclusions reached in partial equilibrium analysis to general
equilibrium problems. When the whole economy is the subject of
analysis, offsets must be introduced.238
He further noted: "If economically meaningful results are to be
produced, great care must be exercised in classifying variables, and the
use of ceteris paribus as a tool of analysis must be approached with great
,,239caution.
D. Explaining A Model's Failure-The Identification of Active Causal
Interference
By attempting to isolate the "causal efficacy" of the antecedent prop-
erties of Ai with respect to Ai -4 B,240 we are presented with the
opportunity to discover additional causal influences (or disturbances) on
the idealized model Ai - B. The discovery of such additional influences
237. Teller, supra note 205, at 733 ("What makes a generalization ceteris paribus is
that there are conditions of application, which have not been explicitly stated, and what
makes cp-generalizations so puzzling from the point of view of exact laws is that the
conditions of application of cp-generalizations can never be fully specified.").
238. Buchanan, Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology, supra note 204, at 56.
239. Id. at 61.
240. Rupert, supra note 208, at 368.
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or disturbances may predict when our model may or may not hold for
reality.
241
When a ceteris paribus law fails to hold for reality, we can nonetheless
explain away its failure. Sometimes, the counteracting factors can be
cited and relevant laws invoked, giving us at least an approximate
prediction of their combined effect. Other times, the interfering factors
may be unique and fall under no law, yet we can reasonably explain
away their influence.
24 2
To summarize, the use of a ceteris paribus clause or qualification is a
recognition by the social scientist that: (1) the model's antecedent prop-
erties may be interdependent, and (2) there may be other disturbing
influences that may affect the causal model's performance. If the model's
output provides societal value, then it becomes a critical task of the pol-
itical economist to: (1) identify, assess, and account for any significant
interdependent relationships among the model's antecedent properties, and
(2) identify any other neglected influences that may disturb or impede the
model's performance or explain its failure. Once such relationships and
influences are identified, the political economist is in a better position to
prescribe policy responses to minimize, and even eliminate those that
distort the idealized performance values of model Ai -) B.243
E. Ceteris Paribus and the Advancement of Perfect Competition's
Consequent
This Article proffers the following two propositions:
1. Given its antecedent properties (Ai) and its consequent (B),
economics' model of perfect competition (Ai -' B) holds, ceteris paribus
(i.e., assuming all other influences are equal or held constant). The mod-
241. See Pietroski & Rey, supra note 207, at 96 ("This notion of a 'partial explanation'
is not at all mysterious. For cp-laws partially explain phenomena by 'whittling down'
what needs explaining.").
242. Kincaid, supra note 205, at 72; cf. Michael Sollberger, Commentary on Jaegwon
Kim, Laws, Causation, and Explanation in the Special Sciences, 27 HIST. & PHIL. LIFE
SCI. 339, 340-41 (2005) ("Roughly, if a causal relation Kl -- K2 is defeated on a given
occasion, we should not take eo ipso the law to be refuted. For we can maintain that
unless there is an altering condition C that interferes with K1 -- K2, the occurrence of Kl
necessarily entails the occurrence of K2-these restrictions being exactly what ceteris
paribus laws should be expected to be.").
243. Kusch, supra note 228, at 159. Kusch argues that "in scientific practice, ideal-
ization is typically followed by 'de-idealization.' That is to say, scientists seek to increase
the predictive accuracy of their theories by removing idealizations." Id.
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el's conditional dependency on its ceteris paribus clause reveals that the
model's axiomatic performance requires that all market participants be
subject to the same game rules and game space. To state it in the negative,
influences cannot be equal nor be assumed to be held constant if market
participants are not subject to the same game rules or game space. The
economic model of perfect competition fails in the absence of universal
game rules and commonality of game space.
2. Given its antecedent properties (Ai) and its consequent (B),
economics' model of perfect competition (Ai 4 B) holds, ceteris absentus
(i.e., assuming the absence of all other disturbing influences). The model's
conditional dependency on its ceteris absentus clause reveals that the
model's axiomatic performance requires the absence of different game
rules and game spaces with respect to all market participants. The
presence of different game rules and game spaces catastrophically inter-
feres with the model's performance and its wealth-creating consequent
(B).2
44
With the aid of game theory, the following discussion demonstrates
the validity of these reciprocal propositions. Specifically, Part V illustrates
that the causal link between liberty, autonomous individual action, and the
establishment of a well-governed, wealth-creating society necessarily de-
pends on uniform game rules and a commonality of game space.
V. GAME THEORY, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION, AND
RELEVANT EFFICIENCY CONCERNS
Since the publication some sixty years ago of von Neumann's and
Morgenstern's seminal work entitled Theory of Games and Economic
244. Pietroski & Rey, supra note 207, at 94-95 ("It is important to notice that, on our
account, an interfering factor can explain [an abnormal instance of a model's perform-
ance] in conjunction with the very cp-law for which it is an interference. Generally, there
are two importantly different kinds of ... abnormal instances, which we will call the 'cat-
astrophic' and the 'everyday.' In catastrophic cases, interfering factors have their effect in
a fashion that completely stifles the normal effects of the antecedent's conditions .... In
['everyday' abnormal instances], the fact that apparently falsifies a cp-law is partly
explained by that very law.... A cp-law cannot, of course, wholly explain any fact that
entails that the cp-law has a[n] ... abnormal instance. But the cp-law may partially
explain such a fact. Indeed, if (as we have been suggesting) actual phenomena are
typically complex, and cp-laws effectively ignore some of the relevant factors, one
should expect cp-laws to provide only partial explanations of actual phenomena."
(emphasis in original)).
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Behavior,24 5 game theory has transformed the theoretical foundations of
both economics and the law.246 Central to the theoretical foundations of
modem game theory are: (1) its acceptance of the positivist observation
that human nature is driven by principles of utility maximization; and (2)
its recognition that the utility/profit maximization process involves stra-
tegic decision-making.
247
Unique to the human species is its "propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another."248 The decision to "truck, barter and
exchange" is purposeful behavior. Subject to certain limitations, "the indi-
vidual decides somehow or other what goods and services to purchase."
249
Such decisions are rarely "random or haphazard" or "in strict conformity
with some customary, purely habitual mode of behavior. ' 250 Rather,
245. VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 104.
246. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1990)
("[T]he theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory."); see also
MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION xiii-xiv
(BasicBooks 1983) (1970) ("In the decades that followed von Neuman [sic] and
Morgenstern's creation, the mathematical theory has matured and the applications have
multiplied-you need only look under the heading 'game theory' or 'prisoner's dilemma'
in the abstracts of psychology, sociology, or political science journals to see the
proliferation."); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory and the Law 2-6 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 437, Oct.
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287846; Id. at 6-7 ("Legal scholars make
great use of the concept [prisoner's dilemma], having mentioned it [in] an astonishing
number of law review publications-over 3000 according to a Westlaw search-to
explore topics ranging from contracts and property, to international law, race discrimi-
nation, feminism, social norms, the federal judiciary, and, indeed, actual prisoners.").
247. See VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 104, at 8-15; see also
Buchanan, supra note 47, at 5 ("There is a positive counterpart to the logic of choice, and
this extends theory to the interaction among separate decision-makers. Commencing with
the fact that choosers choose and that they do so under constraints which include the
behavior of others, the economist can begin to make meaningful statements about the
results that emerge from the interaction of several choosers. Certain 'laws' can be
deduced, even if conceptually refutably hypotheses cannot be derived. Analysis makes no
attempt to specify preference orderings of particular choosers. The 'law' of choice states
only that the individual decision-maker will select that alternative that stands highest on
his preference ordering.").
248. 1 SMITH, supra note 42, at bk. 1, ch. ii, p. 25 ("It is common to all men, and to be
found in no other race or animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species
of contracts.").
249. FRIEDMAN, supra note 116, at 35 ('The goods that an individual can buy are, of
course, limited by his resources-his income and wealth-and by the prices or terms at
which goods and services are available.").
250. Id. ("[Olne supposes, because even casual observation suggests more consistency
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economists maintain that such decisions are "deliberative act[s] of
choice."25' It is in this context that economics supposes "that the indi-
vidual in making these decisions acts as if he were pursuing and
attempting to maximize a single end' 252 (i.e., "the satisfaction of [his or
her] desire 253). Accordingly, the act of maximizing one's satisfaction
involves the act of strategically choosing between known alternatives; it
involves "the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions
of its environment," 254 as well as "a person's conscious adjustment to the
state of the universe that determines his life. ' 25 5 It is this dynamic, indivi-
dualistic, and yet interdependent act of consciously and strategically
adjusting to the state of one's universe that lies at the heart of game
theory. Accordingly, given the multi-person, dynamic game space of the
economy and its condition of rationality, there is little doubt regarding the
relevancy of game-theoretic tools in economics: 256 economics is "the
science of choice."
257
and order in choices than would be expected from [randomness] and more variation than
would be expected from [custom or habit].").
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 1 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE OF ECONOMICS 11-13
(Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007) (1949) ("The field of our science is human action .... [the]
acting man chooses, determines, and tries to reach an end. Of two things both of which he
cannot have together he selects one and gives up the other. Action therefore always
involves both taking and renunciation .... Acting man is eager to substitute a more
satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory."); see also BECKER, supra note 89, at
26 ("The essence of this model of rational behavior is contained in just two assumptions:
each consumer has an ordered set of preferences, and he chooses the most preferred
position available to him."); VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 104, at 8 ("The
subject matter of economic theory is the very complicated mechanism of prices and
production, and of the gaining and spending of incomes. In the course of the development
of economics it has been found, and it is now well-nigh universally agreed, that an
approach to this vast problem is gained by the analysis of the behavior of the individuals
which constitute the economic community .... One of the chief difficulties lies in prop-
erly describing the assumptions which have to be made about the motives of the
individual. This problem has been stated traditionally by assuming that the consumer
desires to obtain a maximum of utility or satisfaction and the entrepreneur a maximum of
profits."); supra Part II.D (discussing scarcity-choice maximization nexus).
254. 1 VON MISES, supra note 253, at 11.
255. Id.
256. ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS xi (1992) ("Game
theory is the study of multiperson decision problems. Such problems arise frequently in
economics. As is widely appreciated, for example, oligopolies present multiperson
problems-each firm must consider what the others will do. But many other applications
of game theory arise in fields of economics other than industrial organization. At the
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Additionally, since the publication of Baird, Gertner and Picker's work
entitled Game Theory and the Law258 in 1994, the use of game-theoretic
tools in the analysis of the law has become more and more popular among
legal theorists. The book's premise is that:
[G]ame theory can offer insights to those who want to understand how
laws affect the way people behave. Laws often matter in situations in
which the behavior of one person turns on what that person expects
others to do. Because strategic behavior is common, the formal tools
that can help us understand it are important.
259
With the use of game-theoretic tools, this Part explores the strategic
behavior of market participants given the imposition of institutional rules.
Specifically, it will illustrate the efficiency implications of executive dis-
cretion with respect to the enforcement of legal rules.
A. Simultaneous Decision-Making and the Normal Form Game
Using a traditional game theory construct referred to as the Normal
Form Game, 26 Figures 7, 8, and 9 below demonstrate the efficiency
implications associated with executive discretion and asymmetrical enfor-
cement policies. The generalized, normal-form game specifies: "(1) the
players in the game, (2) the strategies available to each player, and (3) the
payoff received by each player for each combination of strategies that
could be chosen by the players., 261 The play of the game requires that
micro level, models of trading processes (such as bargaining and auction models) involve
game theory. At an intermediate level of aggregation, labor and financial economics in-
clude game-theoretic models of the behavior of a firm in its input markets (rather than its
output market, as in an oligopoly).").
257. Buchanan, supra note 47, at 3.
258. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW (1994).
259. Id. at xi.
260. See id. at 7; see also GIBBONS, supra note 256, at 2-3.
261. GIBBONS, supra note 256, at 3-4 ("We will often discuss an n-player game in
which the players are numbered from I to n and an arbitrary player is called player i. Let
Si denote the set of strategies available to player i (called i's strategy space), and let si
denote an arbitrary member of this set. (We will occasionally write si f Si to indicate that
the strategy si is a member of the set of strategies Si) Let (sl, ..., sn) denote a
combination of strategies, one for each player, and let ui denote player i's payoff
function: ui(sl, ... , sn) is the payoff to player i if the players choose the strategies (s],
.... sn). Collecting all of this information together, we have: ... The normal-form repre-
sentation of an n-player game specifies the players' strategy spaces S1 ... Sn and their
payoff functions ul, ... , un. We denote this game by G = IS1 ... Sn; ul, ... , uni."
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each player simultaneously choose a strategy without knowing what the
other is doing.262 In each of the following games spaces (often referred to
as game tables, 263 or bi-matrices264), the players are identified as Firms A
and B, with each of the bi-matrices reflecting the individual payoffs
associated with each player's possible moves (or plays). In each of the
game spaces, payoffs are represented by 7c (a firm-specific value repre-
senting firm profits) and 7t (an alternative firm-specific value representing
adjusted firm profits after internalizing otherwise external transaction
costs).
265
Each of the following games involves the strategic choice of intern-
alizing costs associated with a negative externality (i.e., an external cost in
the exchange transaction). An externality is a cost or benefit that is
ignored by market participants when exercising their choices with respect
to consumption or production. 266 The classic textbook example of a neg-
ative externality is pollution.267 If a producer is free to pollute and chooses
(emphasis in original)); see also BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 258, at 7-8 ("The
normal form game consists of three elements: 1. The players in the game. 2. The
strategies available to the players. 3. The payoff each player receives for each possible
combination of strategies.").
262. GIBBONS, supra note 256, at 2; see also BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note
258, at 6.
263. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 36 (2003)
("One device that's sometimes useful when working with games, especially when two
players are involved, is the game table.").
264. GIBBONS, supra note 256, at 3 ("Like a matrix, a bi-matrix can have an arbitrary
number or [sic] rows and columns; 'bi' refers to the fact that, in a two-player game, there
are two numbers in each cell-the payoffs to the two players.").
265. See generally BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 258.
266. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 67; see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at
641 ("[Externalities-the effects of production and consumption activities not directly
reflected in the market .... "); see also HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 25-26 (2d ed. 2006) ("Externalities exist when the
actions of one party affect the utility or production possibilities of another party outside
the exchange relationship. Externalities can prevent a market from being efficient. If a
firm emits pollution into the air, it can adversely affect the welfare of the firm's surround-
ding neighbors. If the firm does not bear these costs, it is likely to select an inefficient
level of pollution (that is, to overpollute). In choosing how much to invest in pollution
control equipment, the firm will consider only its own private costs and benefits. A
socially-efficient investment would also consider the costs and benefits imposed on the
neighbors.").
267. See generally COLANDER, supra note 90, at 428-30; WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN,
ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 370-90 (8th ed. 2009); Id. at 60-61 ("For
example, a paper mill fouls the air breathed by nearby residents, but the price of paper
fails to reflect such costs. Because these pollution costs are outside, or external to, the
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to ignore, or is otherwise not held responsible, for the third-party harm
accompanying the pollution, the third-party harm (i.e., the added social
costs) associated with the pollution will be external to the firm's aggregate
cost of production. 268 Consequently, the firm's private cost of production
will not reflect the actual social cost of production due to its failure to
account for the external costs resulting from the referenced pollution.
269
This means that marginal private costs will be below the marginal social
cost, and the equilibrium price determined by the unfettered forces of
supply and demand will be lower than it should be to maximize social
welfare.
270
The existence of an externality indicates the absence of one or more of
the operational conditions of economics' model of perfect competition:
market participants are not fully informed as to all economic and tech-
nological data necessary for them to make a utility, maximizing choice in
an environment of scarcity. Figure 7 below illustrates the inefficiency
resulting from the existence of a negative externality. Because firms fail to
internalize the third-party costs of their production, they will produce Qe
units at a price of P.. However, once firms internalize such costs into their
private costs of production, the industry supply curve (S) will shift to S'.
Upon the internalization of the externality, firms will decrease their total
output from Q, to Qe', and at Qe' price will rise from Pe to Pe'. Unless all
costs and benefits are internalized into a market participant's marginal
analysis, the perfectly competitive economic model is incapable of attain-
ing its anticipated efficiency outcomes. In the case of a negative extern-
ality, more is produced and consumed than society finds to be socially
beneficial, and consequently, the competitive model fails (resulting in
waste).
This example of market failure was chosen for two purposes. First, it
demonstrates an economic justification for government intervention.
Regulating externalities is arguably one of government's most noble and
practical roles. To the extent that government engages in regulatory affairs
for the purpose of facilitating the operational conditions of the perfectly
competitive market, its intervention is of a remedial and limited character.
market, they are called externalities. An externality is a cost or a benefit that falls on a
third party. A negative externality imposes an external cost, such as factory pollution or
auto emissions.").
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Second, the failure of government to uniformly enforce such regulations
exacerbates the market failure the regulation was designed to address.
Figure 7 NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND ACCOMPANYING
INEFFICIENCIES
S'= Marginal Social Cost = Marginal Private
Costs + Marginal Cost o Third Parties
-External Costs
S = Marginal Private Cost
t\Pe
D = Marginal Social Benefit
Qe' 14 Qe
Figure 8 demonstrates the classical normal form game depicting the
situation in which two competing firms-A and B-have the choice of
internalizing firm-specific negative externalities in the absence of reg-
ulation requiring them to do so. Both firms can maximize their respective
profits (a) by refusing to internalize the costs associated with the
referenced externalities. Internalizing such costs will increase their res-
pective production costs, and thereby reduce their respective payoffs
(profits) from t to t', where n > t'. Consequently, cell I is the dominant
strategy 271 for both firms, and is ultimately the game's equilibrium (the
combination of strategies chosen by both Firms A and B). 27 2
271. ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 20 (4th ed. 2007) ("The strategy si* is a dominant strategy if it is a player's
strictly best response to any strategies the other players might pick, in the sense that
whatever strategies they pick, his payoff is highest with si*." (emphasis omitted)).
272. Id. at 12; see also DAVIS, supra note 246, at 17 ("What are equilibrium strategies
and what are equilibrium points? Two strategies are said to be in equilibrium (they come
in pairs, one for each player) if neither player gains by changing strategy unilaterally. The
outcome (sometimes called the payoff) corresponding to this pair of strategies is defined
as the equilibrium point. As the name suggests, equilibrium points are very stable. In
two-person, zero-sum games, at any rate, once the players settle on an equilibrium point,
they have no reason for leaving it.").
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Figure 8
CLASSIC NORMAL FORM GAME EXTERNALITIES
WITHOUT REGULATION
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The failure to impose regulation requiring the internalization of negative externalities
renders cell (1) the dominant strategy for Firms A & B, provided tAB> 7EA,B" due to the
increased cost associated with voluntarily internalizing identified negative externalities
assuming neither Firms A or B experience intangible payoffs associated with voluntary
internalization that more than offset the costs associated with same. Cells (!1) & (111) are
dominant plays provided either Firm A or B experience asymmetric intangible payoffs such
Figure 8 is an example of a game space involving a market failure
resulting from a negative externality. To reiterate, the operational
condition/assumption that all market participants be fully apprised of all
costs and benefits associated with their respective market is violated. The
fact that certain externalities are not internalized in the costs of production
further obstructs the ability of market participants from making a rational,
utility-maximizing decision (another important operational condition of
the perfect competition model).273 Neither Firm A nor Firm B has much
incentive to take corrective action with respect to its production strategy,
especially since there is no regulation requiring either to internalize their
273. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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respective externalities. Choosing to internalize the externality will result
in lower market payoffs to both firms. To choose to internalize their
respective externalities will also result in either firm being placed at a
competitive disadvantage with respect to the other unless both choose to
do so (i.e. both choose the payoffs in cell IV). Even if both agree to
internalize the externality, there will be an immediate incentive for one or
the other to immediately discard such a choice and move their strategic
play into cells II and III, and perhaps even eventually move their strategic
play into cell I.
Figure 9 CLASSIC NORMAL FORM GAME REGULATION OF EXTERNALITIES WITHOUT
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Where RA' < 71B Where IA' Z 7B'
The failure to impose non-compliance sanctions renders cell (I) the dominant strategy
for Firms A & B, provided n a> nA,a" due to firm specific compliance costs and
assuming neither Firms A or B experience intangible compliance payoffs that more
than offset their costs of compliance. Cels (11) & (I) are dominant plays provided
either Firm A or B experience asymmetric intangible payoffs such that n' > n.
Figure 9 involves a game space in which a regulation has been
imposed making it unlawful for either firm to generate the externality in
question. However, the regulation fails to impose any sanction for its
violation. Either firm can choose to comply or not to comply with the
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regulation. The lack of sanctions creates a very unstable equilibrium. Both
Firms A and B will likely choose a strategy of non-compliance (cell I),
provided neither experiences additional intangible payoffs associated with
compliance (i.e., as long as 7E > 7r'). The mere fact that the generation of
the externality is unlawful may nonetheless affect the payoff of either
firm. To the extent that either firm (but not both) is committed to honoring
the rule of law, the play of the game may move to either cells II or IfI,
where either Firm A or Firm B (but not both) honors the law and
internalizes the externality, thereby experiencing increased production
costs and lower financial payoffs. In cells II and III, the firm in non-
compliance will experience a competitive advantage over the firm in
compliance. Consequently, a regulation without sanction creates a very
unstable equilibrium, dominated by the issue of whether a firm will choose
to voluntarily honor the rule of law at the expense of profits.
CLASSIC NORMAL FORM GAME REGULATION OF EXTERNALITIES WITH
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for non-compliance
Compliance
Where nA^ < 7B
IrA
Where t n- (s)
The imposition of sanction (s) deters non-compliance whereby the dominant strategy
for both Firms A & B may be found in cell (IV), provided (1) taB' > (na" - s), and
(2) a universal, uniform and equal regulatory enforcement policy.
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Figure 10 represents a game space in which a regulation is imposed
requiring all firms to internalize their respective externality. In this sit-
uation, however, non-compliance results in sanctions. With the imposition
of sanctions, cell IV represents both firms' dominant strategy. It will also
be the game's equilibrium, provided that: (1) the payoff associated with
compliance exceeds the payoff associated with non-compliance after acc-
ounting for the imposition of a regulatory sanction (i.e., 7tA,B > (7tA,B - s'));
and (2) the regulation is universally, uniformly, and equally enforced with
respect to all market participants. The failure of either the sufficiency of
the sanction or uniform enforcement destabilizes the game's equilibrium.
To the extent that the sanction is rarely imposed in the event of a violation,
or to the extent that the regulation is not uniformly enforced with respect
to all market participants, or worse yet, to the extent that the regulation is
not enforced with respect to certain political constituents, the game is
destabilized.
B. Destabilization of the Game
The above simple, one-play games274 suggest that the economic model
of perfect competition fails in the absence of universal and uniformly-
enforced game rules and commonality of game space. First, if regulations
are not universal and uniformly-enforced, they fail to correct the existing
market failure they were designed to remedy, and the regulatory effort is
rendered ineffective. It is simply not enough that a regulation be prom-
ulgated; it must be universally applied and uniformly enforced. Second,
the failure to universally and uniformly enforce such corrective regulation
directly violates the ceteris paribus condition/assumption of the perfectly
competitive economic model. It is impossible to assert that all other influ-
ences, disturbing or otherwise, are constant if market participants are not
subject to the same game rules or game space.
274. COLANDER, supra note 90, at 314-15 ("While formal game theory can quickly
become very complicated and mathematically intimidating, much of the power of game
theory does not lie in its formal application, but rather in its informal application, which
simply involves setting up a study of human interactions in a game theoretic or strategic
framework .... Instead of assuming that people are high-powered calculating machines
who can figure out their optimal strategy, no matter how complicated it may be (that's the
Nash equilibrium), informal game theory looks at how people actually think and behave
and is thus empirically based. Informal game theory doesn't provide definite answers;
instead, it provides a framework for approaching questions.").
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Equally important is the fact that different game rules and game spaces
catastrophically interfere with the model's performance and its wealth-
creating consequent. As illustrated in the following Part, different rules, or
the absence of uniformly enforced rules, create asymmetrical competitive
advantages and disadvantages in the marketplace that further obstruct the
efficiencies of perfect competition.
VI. THE ANTICOMPETITIVE/UNFAIR COMPETITIVE NATURE OF AN
ASYMMETRICAL GEOPOLITICAL MARKET REGIME
The existence of a competitor who achieves above-normal returns, in
defiance of the perfectly competitive model's condition of long-run zero
economic profits, suggests either: (1) continued entrepreneurial innovation
and enhanced efficiencies in production, or (2) an otherwise suspect,
imperfectly competitive market driven by unique conditions. In the case of
sustained above-normal profits inuring to a firm because of the sov-
ereign's failure to uniformly enforce the rule of law with respect to all
market participants, such above-normal profits are likely a distortion
driving further market inefficiencies and waste. Such below-market costs
ultimately create single-firm market power sufficient to further jeopardize
and threaten several of the perfectly competitive model's underlying
conditions (i.e., the model's necessary conditions of price-taking par-
ticipants, no entry or exit barriers, fully informed buyers and sellers, and
ceteris paribus). These conditions are all at risk, provided the firm's
conduct is driven by its realization of lower production costs as compared
to firms respecting the rule of law and choosing compliance.
A. Perfect Competition and the Price-Taking Firm with Long-Run Zero
Economic Profits
Figure 11 illustrates a rational, profit-maximizing, price-taking firm in
long-run equilibrium experiencing zero economic profits. At market price
Pe = Pc (the competitive price charged by the firm), the firm will produce
quantity Qs, where the market price line, the firm's marginal revenue
(MR) curve, and its perceived horizontal demand curve (dth), intersect its
long-run marginal cost curve (LMC), at the minimum point of its long-run
average total cost curve (LATC). Given that all of the previously
discussed underlying conditions of perfect competition hold, the market
will produce quantity Qe units at a market clearing price of Pe. At PeQe,
the market minimizes, if not eliminates, waste in an economic environ-
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ment of scarcity.
Figure 1 PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE PRICE.TAKING FIRM WITH
LoNG-RuN ZERO ECONOMIC PROFITS
Firm in Competition Market Supply and Demand
LMC =I Sa- S = LMC,1a
LTC




Upon the executive's decision to suspend the uniform and equal
enforcement or administration of an otherwise lawfully promulgated rule
of law or regulation, firms favored by such executive action may likely
experience above-normal profits (i.e., economic profits), especially if the
failure to enforce the rule in question leads to a reduction in the favored
firm's production costs. The suspension of the execution of a rule of law
has the propensity to arbitrarily drive the favored firm's entire cost
structure downward, with its marginal cost, average total cost, and average
variable costs curves shifting downward, allowing the firm to capture
distorted above-normal economic profits. The firm's lower cost structure
is not the result of entrepreneurial innovation, inventiveness, ingenuity, or
resourcefulness. Rather, the firm's lower cost structure is the result of
marketplace privilege, nurtured by the executive's failure to uniformly and
equally enforce a rule of law with respect to applicable market
participants.
B. Asymmetrical Enforcement Policies in Violation of Ceteris Paribus
Figure 12 illustrates the downward shift in the firm's entire cost
structure, realized by the arbitrary and capricious exercise of executive
discretion with respect to law and regulatory enforcement. As a result of
such discretion, a firm's long-run marginal cost, average total cost, and
average variable cost curves shift to LMC', LATC', LAVC' and res-
pectively. As a rational profit-maximizer, the firm's output will increase
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from Qs to Qs', should it decide to continue to sell its output at the market
price of Pe = Pc. This will allow the firm to capture potential above-
normal profits equal to the area of rectangle PcABPp*. The firm's
increased output will likely have an impact on the market price to the
extent that it causes total supply to shift to the right. To the extent that
market output exceeds, and is to the right of Q,, the "but for" equilibrium
quantity ("but for" the executive exercise of discretion), such output will
be a distortion of the supply and demand forces, resulting in economic
waste. More will be produced than the forces of supply and demand would
otherwise dictate, and resources will no longer be driven to their highest
valued uses. Furthermore, to the extent market price declines ever so
slightly as a result of the firm's increase in output, other market com-
petitors (for whom executive discretion fails to favor), who otherwise
would experience a long-run equilibrium of zero economic profits, will
now likely face losses at the margins.
Figure 12 THE FAILURE TO UNIFORMLY ENFORCE THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
VIOLATION OF CETERIS PARIBUS (DISTORTING MARKET INPUT COSTS
Discretionarily Favored Firm Market Supply and Demand
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C. Market Power and Sustained, Long-Run Above Normal Profits
If the firm can sell all of the goods it wishes without having any effect
on price, the market price will indeed be the extra revenue obtained from
selling one more unit.275 In perfect competition, a rational, profit-
275. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 112, at 252 ("A firm may not
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maximizing firm will fix its output where its marginal cost equals its
marginal revenue, which is equal to the market price (MR = MC = P). In
perfect competition, firms are consequently price-takers; they each pro-
duce such a negligible amount of the total market supply that none are
capable of affecting price by the amount they choose to produce.
Figure 13 MARKET POWER AND SUSTAINED, LONG-RUN ABOVE NORMAL PROFITS





Figure 13 illustrates the newly created market power 276 realized from
the firm's artificially lowered cost structure resulting from arbitrary and
capricious enforcement of the rule of law. The market price (as determined
by the unfettered forces of supply and demand) equals Pe. However,
because of the firm's newly lowered cost structure (as reflected by the
MC, ATC and AVC curves in Figure 13), the firm now has the power to
always be able to sell all it wants at the prevailing market price, however. If it faces a
downward-sloping demand curve for its product, more output can be sold only by
reducing the good's price. In this case the revenue obtained from selling one more unit
will be less than the price of that unit because, in order to get more consumers to take the
extra unit, the price of all other units must be lowered.").
276. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 328 (defining "market power" as
"the ability-of either a seller or a buyer-to affect the price of a good"); see also ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK 5 (2005) ("The economic
concept of market power is central to the legal analysis of most antitrust cases. Like
economists, courts have used the term 'market power' to describe situations in which a
firm or group of firms have control over price and output."); 13 HERBERT HOvENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I
221 1c, at 291 (2d ed. 2005) ("[C]ourts sometimes define 'market power' as involving
either the power to raise price above cost or else the power to exclude .... ").
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increase its output by setting its price somewhere between Pc = Pe and
pp.
2 7 7
D. Market Power, Arbitrary Market Exit, and Barriers to Entry
Figure 14 MARKET POWER AND ARBITRARY MARKET ExiT
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Figure 14 further illustrates Firm A's newly created market power, as
defined by its ability to set a price between the otherwise given market
price of Pe = Pc and Pp, while continuing to earn above-normal economic
profits. In the absence of marketplace privilege incurring as a result of
executive discretion, Firm B will experience long-run zero economic
profits, or rather, normal-profits. Firm A, however, can prey on Firm B,
and others similarly situated in the market, by setting price below the
otherwise given market price, thus setting price below Firm B's average
total cost curve at Pp'. In such a situation, Firm B has no choice but to
meet Firm A's price of Pp', especially since Firm B is a price-taker by
definition (unless, of course, Firm B also chooses to ignore the law or
regulation that competitively disadvantages Firm B). At a price equal to
Pp', Firm A will realize above-normal economic profits, but Firm B will
not. Since price Pp' is less than Firm B's average total costs, Firm B will
only minimize its losses at a price equal to Pp'. Consequently, at price Pp',
Firm B should consider exiting the market. Given the presence of fixed
costs, the firm's average variable costs are less than its average total cost,
277. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 112, at 252.
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and the "firm is indeed losing money."
278
The fact that Firm A's lowered cost structure is driven by marketplace
privilege resulting from the executive's discretionary enforcement of the
law-rather than some transient market condition-suggests that disfavor-
ed Firm B will continue to sustain losses at price Pp'. Thus, there is little
reason for disfavored Firm B to remain in the market and await a new
long-run equilibrium where it will again earn normal profits on its capital
investment. Firm B's options are to either exit the market, or acquire the
same marketplace privileges.
At prices Pp* and Pp, there is little doubt that Firm B must exit the
market. Prices Pp* and Pp are less than Firm B's average variable costs (Pp*
and Pp < AVC). Again, Firm B has little choice but to exit the market or
attain marketplace privileges.279
278. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 94, at 259 ("The firm should therefore
consider shutting down. If it does, it earns no revenue, but it avoids the fixed as well as
the variable cost of production."); see HIRSCHEY, supra note 137, at 389 ("Under perfect
competition, the firm will either produce nothing and incur a loss equal to its fixed costs,
or it will produce an output determined by the intersection of the horizontal demand
curve and the marginal cost curve. If price is less than average variable costs, the firm
should produce nothing and incur a loss equal to total fixed cost. Losses will increase if
any output is produced and sold when P < AVC. If price exceeds average variable cost,
then each unit of output provides at least some profit contribution to help cover fixed
costs and provide profit. The minimum point on the firm's average variable cost curve
determines the lower limit, or cutoff point, of its supply schedule."); see also
SALVATORE, supra note 150, at 331 ("Another way of looking at this is to say that ... the
excess of [price] ... over the firm's average variable cost (AVC) ... can be applied to
cover part of the firm's fixed costs .... Thus, the firm minimizes its losses by continuing
to produce its best level of output." (emphasis in original)).
279. PINDYCK & RUBJNFELD, supra note 94, at 259-60; see also COLANDER, supra
note 90, at 256 ("The shutdown price for a perfectly competitive firm is a price below the
average variable cost."); HIRSCHEY, supra note 137, at 390 ("Price fails to cover variable
costs at price below ... the minimum point of the AVC curve, so this is the lowest price at
which the firm will operate."); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 104, at 316-17 ("A price-
taking firm maximizes economic profits (or minimizes losses) in the short run by pro-
ducing the output for which marginal cost equals price unless the price is lower than the
minimum of its average variable-cost curve. In that case, the market price is lower than
the average variable cost of producing any and all levels of output, so the firm will
minimize losses by discontinuing production."); NICHOLSON, MICORECONOMIC THEORY,
supra note 112, at 271 ("If price falls below minimum A VC, the firm's profit-maximizing
choice is to shut down and produce nothing."); SALVATORE, supra note 150, at 331
("Thus, point H is the shut-down point of the firm. Below point H, the firm would not
even cover its variable costs, and so by going out of business, the firm would limit its
losses to be equal to its total fixed costs.").
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Firm A's lowered, but distorted input costs, realized by the executive's
arbitrary, capricious, and even deliberate refusal to uniformly enforce the
rule of law, at a minimum, will discourage future market entry. More real-
istically, it likely will constitute formidable, if not impenetrable, barriers
to market entry with respect to firms that fail to gain the favor of the
executive.
E. The Anticompetitive/Unfair Competitive Nature of an Asymmetrical
Geopolitical Landscape
From a purely economic perspective, the absence of a uniform and
equal regulatory enforcement practice, at a minimum, discourages, if not
eliminates, competition. Moreover, to the extent such conduct ultimately
leads to the failure of several operational conditions necessary for
competition to thrive, such conduct results in a competitive injury to the
marketplace, and ultimately, society. The decision to suspend the enforce-
ment of the rule of law by the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, for
example, created an asymmetrical geopolitical landscape for the market
participants in the residential leasehold product market, especially with
respect to the local markets traversing the Cook County line. On the
supply side, to the extent that the exercise of the Cook County Sheriff's
discretion favored landlords in adjacent counties, such landlords were
placed at a competitive advantage. On the demand side, to the extent the
exercise of the Sheriffs discretion favored Cook County lessees, such
lessees were placed at a competitive advantage as well, resulting in
market-distorting outcomes.
Such conduct threatens, jeopardizes, and impedes several underlying
conditions of the perfectly competitive model: it violates the assumption
that all buyers and sellers are price-takers, giving the non-complying firm
significant market power; it creates an environment of exclusion nurtured
by the creation of entry and exit barriers at both the input and output levels
of competition; it generates distorted output levels driven by inaccurate
below-market cost data; and finally, it violates the ceteris paribus assump-
tion to the extent that market competitors seek profit-maximization within
a very unstable, asymmetrical geopolitical infrastructure where different
rules apply to different participants.
For competition to thrive, the geopolitical playing field must be level
for all participants. There is simply no pro-competitive business justifica-
tion for ignoring the geopolitical landscape upon which economic battles
are won or lost. The rules must be equally applied to all economic corn-
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batants; otherwise, an asymmetrical application of the rules will annihilate
the natural utility/profit maximizing incentives that drive the economy.
Figure 15 ECONOMICS' MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION
Ai -'B, where B represents wealth creation, the consequent of Ai; and A,
represents the following matrix of antecedent properties:
Xi: The existence of numerous buyers and sellers each acting
independently and rationally.
X2: Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such a negligible amount
of the total output that no one buyer or seller can influence price by the
amount they either consume or produce.
X 3: There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect to consumer or
producer markets.
Ai = X4 : All market participants, i.e. all buyers and sellers, are fully informed of
all relevant economic and technological data.
Xs: All products are homogeneous, or rather, constitute interchangeable
substitutes for each other.
X6: The forces of supply and demand are free to determine the quantity of
output in a relevant market as well as determine a market clearing
competitive price.
X7: Clearly articulated rights secured by the rule of law uniformly and
equally enforced with respect to all market participants.
X8: Ceteris ParibuslAbsentus, i.e. all other influences relevant to the
perfect competition's performance are equal or absent.
B= Wealth Creation
Figure 15 is a revised summary of the antecedent properties and
conditions necessary for economics' model of perfect competition to
thrive. Inclusive in this revised list is antecedent property X7, requiring
"clearly articulated rights secured by the rule of law uniformly and equally
enforced with respect to all market participants." While antecedent prop-
erty X7 garners both intuitive and theoretical support, it is nonetheless
often ignored in the discussion of executive discretion.
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CONCLUSION
This Article reflects upon several "old truths," reminding that if such
truths are to retain their significance, they must be restated in "the
language and concepts of successive generations. ' 28° The language and
concepts adopted in this discussion are grounded upon modem micro-
economic theory and the concept of strategic games. This Article con-
cludes by reiterating yet another old truth regarding the "rule of law": a
truth that summarizes the underlying premise of this Article; a truth
fundamental to understanding the necessary prerequisites of a thriving
constitutional, commercial republic. In 1885, in his seminal work, The
Law of the Constitution, A. V. Dicey 281 instructed that the "rule of law"
should conceptually reference two important operational meanings:
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and
excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide
discretionary authority on the part of the government.... It [also] means
... equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the
ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts; the
"rule of law" in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of
officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs
other citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals .... 282
The focus of this Article's analysis is executive discretion and its
relevance to the operation of a constitutional, commercial republic. While
280. See HAYEK, supra note 1.
281. See Roger E. Michner, Foreword to A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION xi (Liberty Fund, Inc., 1982) (1885) ("Very few
jurists ever put forward doctrines of constitutional law which become not merely classic
but which remain alive as standards. A year after the publication of Albert Venn Dicey's
Law of the Constitution in 1885, Gladstone already was reading it aloud in Parliament,
citing it as an authority. Half a century later these doctrines were still regarded so
essential and fundamental that a special inquiry was necessary to determine whether more
recent constitutional changes did not infringe on them. The Donoughmore Committee,
whose Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers appeared in 1932, endorsed those
principles as a guide to further practice. Now, nearly a century later, Britain in large
measure is still on the Dicey standard and so, too, is the United States. The doctrines, and
even the names by which they are designated, remain part of the equipment of the student
of public law. Dicey's analysis of legislative power and constitutional conventions must
still be considered by anyone who desires to deal with the foundations of Anglo-
American constitutional law simply because Dicey analyzed those foundations and
enunciated principles, with a power and clarity never before or since attained that make
those foundations intelligible.").
282. DICEY, supra note 281, at 120.
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an executive's refusal to enforce an otherwise lawfully promulgated law
may implicate separation of powers issues, such issues are extraneous to
the analysis addressed above. Rather, this Article speaks solely to the
efficiency implications of executive discretion and its relevance to the
creation of societal wealth.
This Article proceeded in its analysis by adopting the interdisciplinary
methodology of the political economist, identifying the task at hand as
analogous to that of a "medical diagnostician," whose duty it is to pre-
scr-be a remedy to the extent his or her patient requires. It is in this
context that this Article suggested a relationship between the exercise of
executive discretion and marketplace efficiencies. Specifically, the above
analysis proffers the hypothesis that the refusal of an executive (either
state or federal) to enforce an otherwise lawfully promulgated regulation
or law results in economic inefficiencies and waste-the antithesis of
economics' model of perfect competition, entrepreneurship, and the fun-
damental rules of capitalism. This Article advocates the principle that free
enterprise requires the rule of law (even if ill conceived) to be
consistently, equally, and uniformly executed with respect to all market
participants.
While Political Economy is often thought of as an inquiry into the
nature and causes of wealth, it has also been intricately defined as a juris-
prudential inquiry into the laws and regulations that determine the rules of
free enterprise. 284 It is said that "the scope for political economy, is
restricted to those social changes that may legitimately be classified as
'changes in law,' that is, changes in the structural rules under which
individuals make choices." 285 Accordingly, the analysis of the jurispru-
dential administration and execution of the rules relevant to the operation
of free enterprise is necessarily relevant to the diagnostic mission of this
Article.
It is from this neo-classical, Political Economy perspective that this
Article observed artificial, exogenous influences that ultimately jeopardize
the efficiencies necessary to maximize the creation of wealth within a
liberal, constitutional commercial republic. By reiterating several funda-
mental principles of laissez-faire economics and their causal relationship
with the creation of wealth, this Article unveiled explicit disordering
influences that jeopardize the promotion of the general welfare. By identi-
283. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
285. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy,
supra note 2, at 200.
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fying such contravening influences, this Article further revealed normative
policy standards relevant to the administration of a constitutional, com-
mercial republic governed by the rule of law. In short, this Article asserts
that the arbitrary, capricious exercise of executive discretion to ignore,
suspend, or dispense with the execution of a constitutionally promulgated
rule of law is an explicit, disordering influence that negates the effici-
encies necessary for the maximization of societal well-being.
This Article reminds that the generalized laws of microeconomics
constitute ceteris paribus laws; that is, their explanatory and predictive
power requires that all economic influences, other than those theoretically
identified as relevant, remain equal. In the alternative, the explanatory and
predictive power of such generalized laws assumes an absence of all other
influences that might disturb their axiomatic expectations. From its
positivist tradition, economic theory teaches that if all of the operational
conditions of the perfectly competitive model hold, then certain effici-
encies may be achieved to the favor of a wealth-seeking society, ceteris
paribus (assuming all other things remain equal or the absence of all other
disturbing influences). It is from this positive theoretical construct that
normative tenets regarding the maintenance of a well-governed society
may be derived. Specifically (and normatively), a well-governed society
requires the zealous identification and elimination of any and all asym-
metrical, disturbing market influences that may jeopardize the wealth-
creating power of free enterprise. The elimination of such influences is
critical to the preservation of ceteris paribus, a necessary condition for
microeconomics' model of perfect competition to thrive.
Extrapolating from the perfectly competitive model's requirement of
ceteris paribus, this Article observed that the asymmetrical application of,
adherence to, or enforcement of relevant governing laws, regulations, and
rules eliminates any possibility that all other influences on the model's
performance values are neutralized. Rather, such asymmetrical enforce-
ment practices have a disturbing influence on the model's ultimate
performance. Consequently, it may be normatively inferred that the axio-
matic nature of the perfectly competitive model requires that all market
participants be equally subject to the same institutional rules, regulations,
and conventions. To the extent that different rules, regulations, and
conventions apply to competing participants within a single market, such
differences will likely have an isolated and disturbing influence on the
generalized laws of microeconomics. Alternatively stated, the extent that
market rules and regulations are not equally applied to all market
participants, the assumption or condition of ceteris paribus is violated; the
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unequal application of laws and regulations relevant to the market will
undoubtedly have disturbing influences on the generalized axioms of the
perfectly economic model.
This Article first tested its ceteris paribus hypothesis with the use of
game theory constructs. Free enterprise, as more formally described by
economics' model of perfect competition, has long been viewed to be a
dynamic, social process "wholly analogous to a game, namely a game
partly of skill and partly of chance."E6 As with most games, "the indi-
vidual, as a prospective player, will prefer that set of rules which he
predicts will make for a 'better' game, a game that is 'fair,' 'efficient,'
'interesting.', 287 Game theory demonstrates that when the rule of law is
imperfectly or unequally enforced (regardless of whether it is a just or
unjust rule), the productive energies of free enterprise are diminished.
Wealth-creation stalls. The exchange process is mired with uncertainty
and insecurity. The causal link between liberty, autonomous individual
action, and the establishment of a well-governed society capable of
generating universal opulence is broken.
This Article further tested its ceteris paribus hypothesis with the use of
standard microeconomic theory. In the case of sustained, above-normal
profits, resulting from a firm's refusal to comply with an unenforced (or
even irregularly or unequally enforced) rule of law, such above-normal
profits are driven by distorted, below-market (but post-regulation)
production costs. Such below-market costs have the potential to create
single-firm market power sufficient to further jeopardize and threaten
several of the operational conditions of free enterprise and the competitive
marketplace. From a purely economic perspective, the absence of uniform
and equally enforced regulatory enforcement practices, at a minimum,
discourages, if not eliminates, competition. Moreover, to the extent that
such conduct leads to the failure of several operational conditions
necessary for competition to thrive, such conduct results in competitive
injury to the market place, and ultimately, society.
The above analysis demonstrates what should be obvious, but is
nonetheless often ignored: a well-governed society requires that a rule of
law, once lawfully promulgated, and for as long as it remains operational
within its relevant jurisdiction, must be equally and uniformly enforced
with respect to all market participants. Free enterprise mandates such an
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enforcement paradigm. The absence of equal and uniform enforcement ul-
timately obstructs the enterprising nature of free enterprise's spontaneous
order. Its proficiencies with respect to the manifestation of societal
"opulence" are supplanted by the inefficiencies of arbitrary, capricious
privilege and discriminatory advantage. The geopolitical playing field
must be level for all market participants in order for free enterprise to
thrive. To provide otherwise annihilates the natural utility/profit max-
imizing incentives that drive the economy.
